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INTRODUCTION

In the field of teleccminunications

,

technological

progress has deeply changed the competitive structure
betv/een

broadcasters, cable operators and telephone compa-

nies. The boundaries between different types of communica-

tions media and their functions become increasingly diffi-

cult to distinguish

-'-

.

The dissolving distinctions betv;een

printed and broadcasted press on one hand and between
common carriers and broadcasters on the other hand have
also changed the legal and economic environment for the

media-participants these recent years. As the borders
between the different types of media grow more vague, the
traditional criteria and justifications for media-regulation have become insufficient and in need of new definitions

^

Television signals now carry information channels
via the teletext systemi. Telephone lines are used for
transfer of database information and for telefax. The
proposed entry of the telephone comipanies into the business
of video programming via fiber optics is the most recent:
example of the shifting boundaries in the telecommunications market. See e.g.
The Continuing Arguments Over
Telco Entry Broadcasting, Dec. 26, 1988, at 58.
-^

,

,

,

2 Scarcity in the radio-spectrum, for example, was one
of the main justifications for regulating broadcast
activities. See Chapter I.l.a. and notes 25-32. But since
cable television and other techniques for real-time
delivery of video programming have emerged, the scarcity

2

A major problem arising out of this funczLonb.! and

technical overlap between different types cf media, is the

enhanced threat for concentration of media corporations.
Since developments in electronic com-munications enable

broadcasters and publishers to be present all around the
world, they needed to grow and to integrate

their activi-

ties. And because such undertakings require large capital

investments, only justifiable under sufficient econom.ics cf
scale, the concept of corporate bigness entered the v/orld
of modern media-management.

For the broadcasting sector,,

this evolution became only possible since the deregulation

wave in the early 1980

's

-^

.

But other sectors of the

telecommunications sector underwent some changes also

^,

rationale became more and more obsolete. See Chapter II.
and notes 170-176.

2.

^ Deregulation started under the Carter Adm.inistration
the
late 1370 's, resulting in Deregulation of Radio 84
in
FCC 2d 960 (1981). Television was deregulated by the Reagan
appointed FCC in 1984
Deregulation of Commercial Television 98 FCC 2d 1076 (1984). That sam.e year, cable television was freed from control by local municipalities through
the 1984 Cable Policy Act See Chapter I.2.c. and notes
119-139.
,

:

,

.

^ In 1982, an antitrust suit against AT&T resulted in
chopping off the local telephone system.s into what became
seven regional companies. This divestiture, operated
through a settlement between AT&T and the Justice Department, opened the market for com.petition in the telephone
sector, but also freed the mother company from, legal
restrictions to launch itself in the fast grov;ing and
profitable area of satellite communications. See Schv/artz,
Flynn and First, Free Enterprise and Econom.ic Organization
Antitrust 6th Ed., 193 (1933)
,

:

3

driven by

a

political desire tc reduce

tion and tc encourage competition

gcvern.T'.ent

interven-

-^

Never before in the history of mass communications
have airwaves, cable channels and retail bookstores been so

crowded with different produces. At the same time, hcv;ever,
changes in ownership of m.edia corporations occurred m.ore
and more frequently, resulting in an ever decreasing num.ber
of diversified owners of media-outlets °.

In writing this thesis,

the author's m.ajcr concern

was to analyze the legal instruments through v/hich exces-

sive concentration of media-ownership in the United States

could be prevented. This concern is

m.ore

inspired by social

and informational values than by econom.ic issues of

ownership-concentration

'.

Since the subject of diversity

in media is vast and did not remain unexplored in the past

The political aspects of deregulation and its role
to foster U.S. competition in the worldwide telecomjr.unications market are described in Trustall J., Comjnuni cat ions
Deregulation
The Unleashing Of ^\merica's Comjnunicaticns
Industry (1986). After the telephone sector. High Definition Television will also enjoy preferential treatm.ent for
its development into foreign markets. See Sixteen Big U.S
Firms To Form Groups To Develop Advanced TV Technology
Wall Street Journal, Jan. 16, 1989
^

:

,

,

° See, e.g.
Never Have So Few Published For So Many
N.Y. Times, Sept. 19 1988, at 30.
.

,

According to antitrust theories, a market dominated
by only one or a few producers is able to escape the
regular competition rules and tends therefore to set a
higher price than a market with real com.petition v/ould
result in. In media however, the dangerous consequences of
concentration are to be located in terms of diversity of
content and information.
'

4
^,

the focus of the thesis is narrov^ed

dov;n.

to a highly

actual topic, reflecting much of whan is going en today in
the field of telecommunications:

the rc-gulation of the

competitive structure betv/een the broadcasters and the
cable operators. More precisely, the research v;ill focus on
the controversy around the constitutional validity of so-

called must-carry rules, which were enacted by the Federal

Communications Commission

^

in 1965 to preserve the

Commissions policy goals with respect to broadcasters
against the growing expansion of cable television ^^

Originally, the FCC welcomed the quick growth of cable

television as

a

vehicle for promoting its goals of diversi-

ty and media-deconcentration under its authority over

broadcasters activities. However, the technical nature of
cable and its development into an industry with far more

economic potential than traditional broadcasting, have
spurred an evolution that runs afoul of established

principles in case-law and Congressional policy v;ith
respect to the safeguarding of diversity of inform.aticn and
ov/nership in the audiovisual market.

Under the disguise of

° See
e.g.
Compaine, Benjamin M.
Christophe H.
Sterling, Thomas Guback and J. Kenderick Noble, Jr., Who
Owns the Media ? Concentration Of Ownership In The Mass
Com.munications Industry 1979. Owen, Structural Approaches
To The Problem Of Network Economic Dominance
197 9 Duke
L.J. 191. Note, A Regulatory Approach To Diversifying
Comjnercial Television Entertainment
8 9 Yale L.J.
69 4
,

,

,

,

,

,

(1980)
^

Hereinafter called the FCC

^° See Chapter I. 2. a.

and notes 98-108

deregulation and First: Amendment claims, the cable industry
managed to become seme kind of an unregulated m.cncpclv,

disregarding important policies that were developed in this
country since the advent of the electronic media. The

political climate that dominated the FCC during the past
decade favored deregulation and reliance on marketplace
forces

Because this evolution went parallel with

^-^
.

a

looser antitrust enforcement policy by the Adm.inistration,
the danger for economic concentration in the field of the
-^2.

mass media is far from hypothetical

The purpose of this thesis is twofold:

in the first

place, an analysis of broadcasting regulations and subse-

quent case-law will demonstrate the concern by the legislator and regulatory agency to preserve diversity in

opinion and media-ownership through emphasis on "localism."
and a "marketplace of ideas"

-^^.

Arguments will be develo-

ped to show that cable television activities, although
^^ The philosophy of this policy is described in
Fowler and Brenner, A Marketplace Approach To Broadcast
Regulation 60 Texas Law Review 207-257 (Feb. 19S2)
,

^^ The most recent example of

media-concentration is

the proposed merger between Warner Communications and Tim.e
See Time And Warner To Merge, Creating Largest Media
Company N.Y. Times, March 5, 1989, at 1. Bleeping Up With
the Murdochs Business Week, March 20, 19S9, at 32-36.
For the mergers effect on the cable television market:
Time Warner Is Wired For Cable Wars Business Week, April
17, 1984, at 44 and Time-Warner Could Have An Anticom.petitive Effect In The Cable Television Business N Y
Times, March 7, 1989, at 33.
,

,

,

,

,

^^ See

.

Chapter I.I., dealing only with legislation
relating to television broadcasting.

6

technically different from broadcasting, should be governed
by Congress

by identical principles, and has been done so
-'^.

These arguments will help to shed a different light on

the controversy around must-carry rules, v;hich

v.-ere

considered paramount in the preservation of local broadcasting and its public service to the comjr.unity. The author's

principal thesis in the first part of this article is that

must-carry rules could be construed as serving First
Amendment principles rather than violating them, and that
their invalidation by the lower judiciary is inconsistent

with long-standing Supreme Court rulings regarding First

Amendment rights and duties of media-participants and their

contribution to diversity, local self-expression and anticoncentration. A parallel will then be drav/n between the

principles of free speech, as embodied in the First
Amendment, and the goals of anti-concentration in the

antitrust laws

-^^.

This parallel will serve as a pivot to

the second part of the thesis.
In that second part, current antitrust

lav; v;ill

be

analyzed to examine if and to what extent antitrust could
serve as an alternative means for local broadcasters to

seek carriage on the cable system,. This examination v/ill be

more hypothetical in nature, since the issue only became

important after the invalidation of the must-carry rules in
^^ See Chapter I.2.C.,

containing an analysis of the

1934 Cable Policv Act.
^^ See Chapter IV.

and notes 267-283

1986

——

>^

^o
•

>;p-=
,

.

^->'-

''•f!:r'.'7

—'^
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:=

Q

;^
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PART

I

CABLE REGULATION UNDER THE FCC

CHAPTER

I

THE FCC'S JURISDICTION OVER CABLE

Although cable transmission is technically very

different from broadcast 2^, its history and development
have, initially, grown parallel

^-^

.

In its early develop-

ment, cable television was intended to deliver broadcast

signals to localities where reception through the air was

difficult or impossible.

A cominunity located in mountai-

nous areas would build an antenna on high ground to receive
the signals of nearby stations and transm.it them, through

cable to the households in the comjr.unity. Such system.s v/ere

called "Community Antenna Television" or CATV. Since cable
was the only means of bringing television service to these

remote areas, television broadcasters originally v/elcom.ed
2^ Cable television involves the transmission of
electrical signals over wires to television sets in homes
or elsewhere. The technique consists of a "head-end"
(studio or community-antenna) that is connected with all
the television sets of the system, through coaxial cables. A
single cable is capable of carrying a wide range of
television channels. There is no use of the spectrum for
transmitting these signals except for linking up tv;o rem.cte
systems by use of a m.icrowave antenna. This kind of pointto-point transmission is distinct from, broadcast signals,
and is regulated as a common carrier.
-^ It is generally agreed that the first cable
operations began in 1948, but precisely where is a matter
of dispute. See, Cable, The First Forty Years
Broadcas,

ting, Nov.

21,

1938, at 35-49.

10

this technique as a way to expand their audience beyond the

reach of their transmitter-waves
It was soon realized,

'^^

however, that cable could be

more than just an extension of che broadcast service. Its

greater channel capacity enabled cable operators to carry

many more signals from outside the area, to deliver

a

vast

variety of non-broadcast communication programs and to
produce original programming. Next to its technical
characteristics, the economic model on v/hich cable made its
earnings could put broadcasters in a competitive disadvantage ^^. Cable posed a potential threat to the framework
that

Tihe

Federal Communications Commission had developed

for the broadcast industry. While cable was neither

telegraph nor telephone

v;ire,

neither radio nor television,

its relationship to the traditional facilities regulated by

Cable was initially regulated through

the FCC was plain.

the same regulatory philosophy applied in the broadcasting
22

Franklin M.

,

Mass Media Law

,

3rd Ed.,

909

(1983)

Cable operators charge subscribers a fee for the
right to view their programming. Many types of fee may
exist
a basic fee for the traditional cable services v;ith
retransmission of over-the-air programs. An extra fee for
special programs (Pay-TV), self -originated or delivered by
a cable-caster. A cable system is therefore assured to have
a steady, monthly revenue from its subscribers. In addition, it can sell advertising time. But most cable systems
derive less than 5 % of their gross revenue from, advertising.
A Short Course In Cable
Broadcasting/Cablecasting
Yearbook 1988, at D-3)
In contrast, broadcasters derive their revenues not
selling their signal to the viewer but by selling time to
advertisers. Their revenues are thus directly and only
related to their share of the audience and the interest of
the advertisers to invest their monev.
2-^

:

(

,

\ T
b':^'

11

sector.

It is therefore instructive to consider the history

and bases of nhe statute that created the FCC

'

s

authority

and jurisdiction over broadcasters activities.

1)

The 193 4 Coimnunications Act

Reasons for regnlatinq the Spectrum

a)

When radio-transmission

grev;

popular in the early

days of the telecommunications history, the need for

regulation by the federal government became apparent. This
need was not spurred by the desire of government to

regulate this type of activity, but was recognized by the

industry itself, in order to avoid chaos on the airwaves
^"^

.

The rationale for this intervention was twofold
^"^

Different statutes were enacted before 1934
The Wireless Ship Act of 1910 was the first federal
statute regulating the use of radio. It was lim.ited to
radio for point-to-point maritim.e communications and did
not allocate any frequencies. See Kahn F, (Ed.), Documents
of American Broadcasting
4th Ed.
1984
2) The Radio Act of 1912 was the first ccm.prehensive
piece of radio legislation. Congress, basing its authority
on the Comjnerce Clause of the Constitution, made it illegal
to operate a radio station without a license from the
Secretary of Commerce. The Act, however, failed to provide
sufficient discretionary standards for the effective
regulation of broadcasting, which v/as still not envisioned
at this early stage of radio-development. In 1926, the
Secretary was denied authority to require a licensee to
broadcast only at specified times and only on designated
channels, for the Radio Act of 1912 gave him. no authority
to issue regulations.
United States v. Zenith Radio Corp.
et al.
12 F.2d 614 (N.D. 111. 1926)) Following a request
for clarification from the Secretary to the Attorney
General on this matter, (35 Op. Att.'y Gen. July 8 1926)
the crying need for more effective broadcast regulation
:

1)

,

,

(

,

,

12
1.

The scarcity rationale

Government intervention in the use of the airwaves
was considered necessary co avoid chaos among the numerous

voices that wanted to communicate with the public by means
of the radio-electric spectrum

'-^.

This intervention has

been based upon the premise that the facilities for radio
were limited and therefore not available to all who may

wish to use the spectrum. The so-called scarcity rationale
became apparent.
As a result, the Department of Comm.erce
abandoned its efforts to order the airwaves and urged the
radio industry to regulate itself. Chaos ensued as some 200
new stations crowded on the air sv/itching their frequencies
and locations and increasing their power at will. Broadcast
reception became jumbled and sporadic, and the clamor for
new regulation was supported by both the public and the
radio industry itself. The Radio Act of 1927 created the
Federal Radio Commission. Originally intended to be only a
temporary body, the Commission remained in power from, year
to year through various ac^s of Congress.
3) The search for a coherent regulatory standard was
not completed until the Communications Act of 1934 was
passed.
48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. §
This Act granted regulatory power to an
151 et seq.
administrative body, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC). The FCC developed a panoply of regulations that put
several duties on the privilege to use the airwaves. These
regulations were derived from, an interpretation of the
public interest standard. See infra notes 41-49.
(

)

,

^•^

46

Douglas H. Ginsburg, Regulation of Broadcasting

at

,

(1978)
2° Justice

Frankfurter depicted this rationale
accurately in his opinion in National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States 319 U.S. 190 1943 )( hereinafter NBC v. US
... (radio) facilities are limited; they are
not available to all who m.ay v;ish to use them..
The radio spectrum, is simply not large enough
to accommodate everybody. There is a fixed
natural limitation upon the num.ber of stations
that can operate without interfering v.'ith one
another. Regulation of radio was therefore as
vital to its development as traffic control was
to the development of the autom.obile.
,

(

)

^"^

13

differentiates brcadcasting from the c-her media and
explains why its fraedcm of expression is more limited ^'.

Scarcity beget

licensing scheme to ensure orderly use of

a

frequencies and

a

consequent concern that the public be

exposed to diverse information and views. The development
and legitimation of this regulatory scheme grew parallel

with the rapid expansion of the use of the airwaves -^2.
The FCC was, under the scarcity rationale, not only

entitled to allocate licenses and frequencies, but also to
regulate the relationship between broadcasters and networks, and to issue rules preventing anticcm.petitive

behavior such as the "Chain Broadcasting Rules"
Id.

^'

at 213.

,

^"^

Scarcity m.ay not be interpreted in its numerical
term
there are far more broadcasting stations in the U.S.
than there are newspapers. But two nev/spapers can, without
governmental intervention, physically operate in the sam.e
community at the same time. In radio, hov/ever, if there is
only one frequency in the spectrum available for use in a
particular community, they cannot, by the law of physics,
operate together, for to do so would result in neither
being heard.
:

^^

Reserving only a part of the spectrum for the
actual licensing system has been called "the original
Fowler and Brenner supra note 11,
electromagnetic sin".
at 212) Alternatives have been proposed, such as auctioning
of frequencies to the highest bidder. (Todd Bender, A
"Better" Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation 3 6
Fed. Comm. L.J. No. 1, 27-68 (July 1934))
(

,

,

,

2^ In 1943,

the Supreme Court upheld the Chain
Broadcasting Rules under the scarcity rationale in NBC v.
US
supra note 26. Chief Justice Frankfurter described the
FCC as "more than a kind of traffic officer, policing the
wave lengths to prevent stations from, interfering with each
other"
319 U.S. at 216)
,

(

14

In Red Lion Broadcasting v.

FCC

-^^

the scarcity rationale

was held to justify the duty imposed on broadcasters to

cover discussions of public issues and that each side of
those issues must be given fair coverage

^-^
.

Scarcity

provided thus an argument for the FCC to regulate both
structure and programming of broadcasters, within constitutional limits ^2.

2

.

The Impact Theory
In FCC V.

Pacifica Foundation ^^

,

the Supreme Court

observed that "the broadcast media have established

a

uniquely pervasive presence in the live of all Americans"
and that they are "uniquely accessible to children, even
those too young to read"

'^^
.

The Court repeated the leveled

First Amendment protection for different m.edia, as expressed in Burstyn v. Wilson
20

395 U.S.

367

(

^-',

1969

)(

and concluded that "of all

hereinafter Red Lion

)

-^•^
This so-called Fairness -Doc trine was repealed by
the FCC Inquiry into Section 73.1910
Fairness Report of
1985
102 FCC 2d 143) and is distinct from the Equal
Opportunity Rule (§ 315 Comm.unications Act) that equal time
be alloted to all qualified candidates for public office.
See also note 77.
:

(

,

^^ These limits and its critiques thereon will be
analyzed in Ch. II.
33

438 U.S.

2^ Id^,
25

726

(

1978

)(

at 747

343 U.S.

495

(1952)

hereinafter Pacifica)

15

forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has

received the most limited First Am.endmen-c protection"

^'^

It upheld the Commission's determ.ination that "indecent"

broadcasts, as identified in Congressional statutes and

defined by the agency, could be punished.
This theory was developed by the Supreme Courn in
1978,

at a time when broadcasting already existed for about

It can be supplemented with the argum.ent that

30 years.

government, members of Congress and judges regulate

broadcasting because they perceive broadcasting as possessing extraordinary power and because they fear the unknov/n

consequences of that power

'^'^
.

Therefore, authorities

clearly sought new grounds for regulating this industry,
since the scarcity rationale has lost strength through a

technological "channel-boom" and a subsequent deregulation
of the airwaves ^^. The impact theory has recently assumed

increasing prominence to counterbalance the unraveling of
the scarcity rationale during this last decade ^^. The

Commission's involvement in protecting children and adults
from television's "captive quality" is undoubtly content^° Pacif ica
^"^

ment

,

27

P.

supra note 33, at 747

,

Parsons, Cable Television and the First Amend-

(1987)

^^ See infra

^^

Chapter II.

2

and notes 170-176

Lively D.
Deregulatory Illusions and Broadcasting:
The First Amendment's Enduring Forked Tongue 66 North
Carolina Law Review 963-976, No. 55 (1988)
New Indecency Enforcement Standards To Be Applied To
All Broadcast And ;^jnateur Licensees, 2 FCC Rec 2726 (1987)
,

,

.

16

restrictive, and critics propose as an alternative that the

marketplace, speaking through advertisers, critics and
self -selection by viewers, provide an adequate substitute

b)

The Public Interest Standard
The FCC, in granting licenses to the various appli-

cants, is often confronted with the difficulty of making

a

choice among the various candidates. It has, in drafting
the duty to consider various aspects such

its regulations,

as concentration and public policy.

It is prohibited from,

making considerations based upon content

'^^

but must guide

,

its preferences on standards aim.ed at m.axim.alizing the

service to the public, in casu the local comm.unity.
The 1934 Communications Act established a discretion-

ary licensing standard:
and necessity

^'^
.

the public interest, convenience

The Supreme Court has interpreted this

standard as a broad one, "a power not niggardly but
expansive"

^-^,

encompassing many regulations and

a

large

discretion to approve or deny applications for licensees
^'^

Fowler and Brenner, supra note 11

^^ § 426 of the 1934 Communications Act

,

47 U.S.C.A.

§

426
"^^

This standard is used several tim.es in the Statute:
§ 303, 307(a), 307(d), 309(a), 310 and 312

see 47 U.S.C.A.
^^

See NBC v. US, supra note 26, at 219
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^^

,

or to regulate industries which are distinct but
'^^.

closely related to broadcasters, such as the networks

The Court described the public interest standard also as

a

"supple instr^jjnent for the exercise of discretion by the

expert body which Congress has charged to carry out its

legislative policy". ^^

'^^

"^^

^^

A Policy Emphasis based on Localism and Trusteeship

c)

The public interest standard expresses the view that
a

broadcaster is not a mere businessman, selling a common

asset to the advertisers and providing plain entertainm.ent
"to deny a station license because the "public
interest" requires it, is not a denial of free speech" Id.
•^"^

at 227
^^ see NBC v.
"^^

US

,

supra, note SS

FCC V. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.

,

309 U.S.

134

(1940)
'^'
Critics read this discretionary standard as meaning
"about as little as any phrase or word the drafters of the
Act could have used and still comply with the constitutional requiremenr that there be some standard to guide the
administrative Wisdom of the licensing authority." (Caldwell, The Standard Of Public Interest, Convenience And
Necessity As Used In The Radio Act Of 1927 1 Air L. Rev.
,

295

(1930))
^° In the

proposed "rewrite" of the Communications Act
in 1978, authored by the House Subcommittee on Communications, m.ajor revisions were foreseen for broadcast regulations. The most remarkable of these was that no single
reference was made any more to the "public interest"
standard. See H.R. 13015, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., June 6, 1973
^^ The task of defining this standard is open for the

Courts, Congress or the FCC itself
in FCC v. National
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting
(435 U.S. 775 (1973 )m.
hereinafter National Citizens upholding the FCC s crossownership rules, the Court stressed the Corn-mission's broad
discretionary power to determine the public interest.
:

,

)

'
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to its audience. Rather, a broadcaster

v;as

considered

a

"public trustee", endov/ed with an exclusive grant from the
governinent to use the radio spectrun.

In return for this

privilege, the broadcaster had to comply with

a

number of

duties that were defined by the Commission under the vague

public interest standard. The privilege to use the airwaves, which were considered public domain, was conditioned
-^^

not only on content

personal integrity

but also on citizenship

,

-''^

,

-'^,
-'^.

and ownership of other media

Over the years, the public trusteeship approach was

gradually developed into

body of program-ming guidelines

a

that put emphasis on four important considerations deter-

mining the Commission's decision whether or not to grant or
renew

local and network programs on a

license:- 1)

a

sustaining (i.e. noncommercial) basis
programs
and

4)

3

)

2)

local live

programs devoted to discussion of public issues

station efforts to limit the amount of time devoted

^^ Fairness Doctrine

,

See Syracuse Peace Council

,

recently abolished by the FCC.
2 FCC Rec. 5043 (1987) and Ch.

II.
^^ Communications Act 1934 § 310,

47 U.S.C.A.

§

310

(1982)

^^ Policy regarding Character Qualifications in
Broadcast Licensing 102 FCC 2d 1179 (1986)
,

Multiple Ownership Rules forbid a single entity
from owning more than one station of the same type in the
same market. (47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1986)) Crossov/nership of
a broadcast station and cable system in zhe same market is
also prohibited.
Id. § 73.501.") See infra
note 65.
-'^

(
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to hourly advertising

-''^
.

A heavy emphasis was put on the

local character of the broadcaster: his principal duty was
to make a "diligent, positive effort to discover and

fulfill the tastes, needs and desires cf his service area.
If he has met this he has met his public responsibility."
^^

The trusteeship model turned an operator into a super-

citizen, with obligations that go beyond providing goods
and services that the public desires. Critics contend that
this regulation is unnecessary burdensome and that it

contains

a

form of "taxation without representation 56
r-

•

Another critic is that broadcasters have been subjected to

restrictions that bear no relation to the marketplace

^'^

^^ See the so-called "Blue Book" of the FCC s Public
'

Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees (1946)
^^ ReDort and Statement of Policv,
^° R.

&

44 FCC 2303

Posner, Taxation by Regulation
Mgmt. Sci.
22 (1971)

,

2

Bell J. Econ.

,

^'

(1960)

The grandest myth of the trusteeship
model is the belief that the value of
the licenses has remained unchanged
since their granting. The Comjnission
has ignored that tremendous wealth
attaches to the most desirable
licenses, whose value far exceeds the
tangible assets of the stations
holding them. Instead of adopting
regulations that would reflect the
actual value of these licenses, the
Commission has buried its head deeper
into the regulation books and
considered additional behavioral
rules. Such efforts have merely
produced more obligations for these
special public stewards who, in turn,
are usually willing to comply with
whatever the Commission asks, as long
as the cost of compliance is slight.
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d) Goals of

Diversity and Anti-Concentratic n

One premise upon which the First

^jTiendraent

is based

is the existence of a "flourishing marketplace of ideas,

with truth not from governmental regulation but, rather,
from the clash of many voices ^°. Where no government

regulation is constitutionally permitted, the economic

marketplace will determine the number of voices to be
heard. The government's role is limited to ensuring

(through appropriate antitrust involvem.ent and legislation)
that the economic model succeeds ^^.
In broadcasting,

the question arises how the FCC

should act to prevent concentration of media ownership and
a

decrease of the plurality in the spectrum °^. This task

has been recognized by the Supreme Court as making part of
the public interest standard

^-^.

In answering this ques-

tion, it is useful to distinguish betv/een rules that have

an impact on the programming and rules that have not °2.

Fowler and Brenner

supra note 11, at 221.

^

^^ Associated Press v.
^^ Mass

398.

United States

Communications Law

,

,

326 U.S.

1

(1945

West Nutshell Series, at

See also notes 276-277.

°^ The question whether the FCC can consider antitrust
questions in media and hov; private plaintiffs have standing
in a suit against a cable operator v;ill be examined in Part
II. of this thesis.
^1 NBC V.

V.

U.S.
319 U.S. 190 (1940) and United States
Storer Broadcasting Co. 351 U.S. 192 (1956)
,

°^ This distinction will reappear in a further part of
this thesis discussing the validity of must-carry rules in
the cable television sector. See Ch. III.3.e. and notes
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1

.

Speech-neutral P3gulaticn
This set of rules aims

regulating the structure of

az.

the media-industry by preventing concentration of ov.'nership
or restrictive agreemenns between prograin-suppliers and

broadcasters with the goal to promote diversity.
There are several ways to attack the problem:
a.

One way is to prevent the networks from imiposing

their power on the licensees. Such was the case in NBC

United States ^^

v.

where the Supreme Court upheld the so-

,

called Chain Broadcasting Rules as being consistent with
the public interest standard and the statutory duties of

the Commission
b.

°'^.

Another way is to attempt to diversify the

ownership of broadcast facilities through imposing

a

on the number of outlets one single entity

(multi-

m.ay ov;n

limit

ple ownership rules) or to prohibit ov;nership of identical
or integrated media, such as a nev.'spaper and a broadcast

station, in the same community

(

cross -ov.'nership rules) °^.

248-251.
°^

See supra

,

note 26

^^ See Barrow R.

Antitrust & Regulated Industry
Promoting Competition In Broadcasting 196 4 Duke L.J. 2S2,

:

,

306
°^ Multiple Station Ownership has been relaxed from a
7-7-7 rule to a 12-12-12 rule (See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)
and Multiple Ownership-Seven Stations Rules, 56 R.R. 2d 359
(1984)). Under the revised rules, an entity can ov;n up to
12 AM stations, 12 FM stations, and 12 television stations
as long as the TV stations collectively serve less than 25
% of the nation's TV homes.
Qne-to-a-Market Rules forbid a single entity to own a

22

Rules limiting media cross-ownership are based on concerns
about industry ccncencration and com.peti cion. These issues
are also addressed by the antitrust lav/s. Here, cross-

ownership rules address the issue of the public interest in
a

diversity of information sources. The congruence between

diversity of opinion, application of the antitrust

lav/s

and

the First Amendment has been recognized by the Supreme

Court in Associated Press

commonly thought that
greater assurance of

a
a

United States °°. It is

v.

diversity of media-owners provides
diversity of speakers. Similar rules

have been promulgated for multiple ownership of broadcasting outlets and networks, and were upheld by the Courts

^"^

68

radio and a television station in the same market, with
exceptions made for the so-called "grandfathered" com.binations. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.501 (1936)
Cross-Ownership Rules prevent the comm.on ownership of
a broadcast facility and a newspaper in the same market.
Combinations existing before the enforcement of these rules
(1978) were all grandfathered v/ith the proviso that they
could not be sold as a unit to a third party.
See Sherman B., Telecommunications Management
The
Broadcast & Cable Industries 17 3, (1987) and Concentration
of Ownership of the Media of Mass Comjnunication
An
Examination of new FCC Rules on Cross Ov;nership of Collocated Newspapers and Broadcast Stations 2 4 Emorv L.J. 1121
:

,

:

,

(Fall 1975)
For Cable-Broadcasting Crossov/nership Rules see Ch.
I.2.C. and notes 119-139.
^^ 326 U.S.

1

(1945). See also Ch.

and notes 269-

IV.

283.
^"^

U.S.

,

See U.S. V. Storer Broadcasting Co.
supra notes 61 and 26.

°° D.

,

and NBC v.

Brenner and M. Price, Cable Television and Other
Non Broadcast Video
Law and Policy at 4-5 (1984).
:

,
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c.

Rules that prevent local broadcast stations from

being deleted on the nearby cable

syste.T.s

are also

ai.T.ed

at

promoting diversity of sources and localism through
structural regulation °^. None of these rules affect the
content of the programjning and can be enforced v/ithout any

speech-interference.
d.
a

Generally, antitrust laws are the best example of

structural, i.e. speech-neutral, approach to promoting

diversity. The press has long been subject to the antitrust
laws

'^'^.

Although challenged initially, it has been widely

accepted that antitrust regulation of the press poses

fev;

First Amendment problems precisely because it is content
neutral. By limiting concentration of the media, the

antitrust laws substantially increase the likelihood of

diversity in programming. Although such diversity is hard
to predict with certainty,

it is reasonable to assume that

concentration will tend to stifle, rather than promote
multitude of tongues

''

a

'^.

°^ These must-carry rules will be subject of an
extensive analysis in Ch. III.
'^

Associated Press v. United States 326
See e.g.
U.S. 1 (1945) and Lorain Journal v. United States
342 U.S.
143 (1951)
,

,

.

,

"^-^

Bazelon, The First Amendment And The "New Media"
New Directions In Regulating Telecommunications 31 Fed.
Comm. L.J. 201, 209 (1979). See also Ch. IV.

:

,

^2 In National Citizens

(555 F.2d, 929 (1977) aff 'd
775 (1978)), the D.C. Court of Appeals agreed that
diversity is difficult to measure, but that "the FCC can
rely on its sound judgment, based on experience, that true
diversity from a commonly owned station-nev.'spaper com.bina-

436 U.S.
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2.

Speech-Affecting Regulation
These set of rules have been created to assure

diversity and localism within the programming. Broadcasters
have been subjected to

a

far more speech-intrusive regula-

tion than would be allowed constitutionally in the written
press, for example

"-^.

As the main justification for this

governmental intervention was provided by the scarcity
rationale

'^,

and this rationale became more and m.ore

undermined by technological development and

a

growing First

Amendment awareness with broadcasters and cable operators,
the Courts, for the last years, have scrutinized these

rules under a much more stringent constitutional standard.

The FCC, on its turn, has reconsidered many of these

regulations and withdrew them, sometimes without waiting
for judicial invalidation

'

-^

'°.

tion would be unrealistic". Id. at 961. See also note 245.
'^

Different First Amendment standards have been
applied to different media
Burstyn v. Wilson 3 43 U.S.
495 (1952). See also notes 140-152.
:

"^"^

'^

See Red Lion

,

,

supra note 30.

See repudiation of the Fairness Doctrine

:

supra,

note 50.
'°

Only those regulations concerning obscenity and
indecency remained unchanged or have been severed. See
supra, note 39.
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a.

Equal Tims Rule

Sec.

315 of the 1934 Comimunicaticns Act

the concern of the lawmakers that

a

''

expresses

broadcasting facility

might improperly influence an election by affording only
one candidate access to its audience. Although clearly a

statute which regulates content, it has survived attacks on
its constitutionality

"^^
.

Most of the litigation involves

requests in the heat of an election campaign

'^.

Few

decisions have been reviewed by the courts until recently

b.

Fairness Doctrine

Basically, Fairness is the obligation of

a

broadcas-

ter to afford reasonable opportunity for the presentation
of opposing viewpoints on matters of public controversy.

It

vests a broad discretion in the licensee as to the amount
of time to be devoted to the controversy,

the issues to be

covered and other programming decisions. In Red Lion

Broadcasting Co.

37

v.

FCC ^^ the Fairness Doctrine and the

"77

47 U.S.C.A.

'^

For a recent example see Branch v. FCC
Cir. 1987) and infra, note 185.

(D.C.

§

315(a)

'^

,

824 F.2d.

"In contrast with the Fairness Doctrine, § 315 is
quite precise in its application and leaves virtually no
room for broadcaster discretion. It operates v;ith a type of
mathematical certainty not usually found in broadcasting
regulation." Mass Communications Law supra ncce 59, at 438
,

2^ See Franklin

Si 395 U.S.

367

,

supra
(1969)

,

note 22, at 790.
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related personal attack rules were upheld as consistent

with the First Amendment by an unaniT^cus Supreme Court. The
Court based its decision upon considerations of scarcity ^^
and on the need for diversity in the information dissemi-

nated to the public
In 1987,

°-^

°'^.

the FCC inquired the usefulness of the

Fairness Doctrine ^^ and concluded in response to

mandate that the doctrine "contravenes the First

a

Court

J^jnendm.ent

and thereby disserves the public interest" °°. According to
the Commission, the growth of the electronic media had
^2

"Because of the scarcity cf radio f reciL:t::ywj.t;o
Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in
favor of others whose viev.'s should be expressed on this
unique medium." Red Lion 395 U.S. at 390.
,

It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail, rather than
to countenance monopolization of that
market, whether it be by the government itself or a private licensee.
Id.
quoting Abrams v. United States 250 U.S. 616 (1919)
(Holmes, J. dissenting). Associated Press v. United States
326 U.S. 1 (1945) and New York Times v. Sullivan 37 6 U.S.
°-^

,

254

(1964).

°^ A broad lecture of Red Lion suggested a "right of
access for the public to social, political, moral and
aesthetic ideas" Id. In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
V. Democratic National Committee (412 U.S. 94 (1973)) the

Court, however, rejected this theory and reaffirm.ed the
rule that a broadcast station is not a comjr.on carrier which
must open its facilities on demand, even if the demand is
inspired by matters of public importance.
143

^^ Inquiry into § 73.1910
(1985) 58 R.R.2d 1137.

:

Fairness Report 102 FCC 2d

°° In re Syracuse Peace Council,

and Order

,

2

FCC Red 5042 (August

6,

Memorandum Opinion
1987)
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removed the scarcity rationale of Red Lion and did no
longer justify controls upon program content °' °° °^

c.

Prime Time Access Rules

This set of rules reflects a concern v/ith the lack of
local programming activity among netv/ork affiliates. The

rules limit the presence of netv/ork programs on the

affiliates' antenna during the four hours of prime time

Exceptions are made for

nev/s

^'-'.

and educational network

programs

d.

Syndicated Exclusivity and Distant Signal Rules

Syndicated exclusivity limited the carriage of particular
programs on imported distant signals. These distant signals
were also limited in their num.ber to be im.ported by a cable

operator
°'

C.F.R.

§

^'^

Syndex was based on

.

system of priorities

a

The personal attack rule remained unchanged. See 47
73.1920.

^^ Red Lion still remains the law.

See note 1S2.

"^ In Telecommunications Research and Action Center v.
FCC, C.J. Borke concluded that Congress had not incorporated the Fairness Doctrine in the Communications Act when it
amended the Statute in 1959. The opinion also strongly

rejected the scarcity rationale and suggested that the
Supreme Court should come up soon with a m.ore v;orkable
alternative
801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1987), reh'g en banc
denied, 806 F.2d 115, cert, denied 107 S. Ct. 3196
(applying political broadcast rules to teletext).
:

,

^0 See 47 C.F.R.
91 See
Se
Cable

143

(1972)

§

73.658 (h

Television Report and Order, 36 FCC 2d at
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that generally protected a local station against having its

programming duplicated on the same day by cable carriage of
a distant station ^^

.

Through this system, the FCC wanted

to preserve the syndicated market for broadcasters

Both syndex and distant signal rules

v/ere

^•^.

repealed by

the FCC in 1982, considering that "com.petition from cable

television does not pose a significant threat to comjnercial
television"

^'^.

On May 18,

1988,

the FCC reinstituted a

simplified form of syndicated exclusivity rules and

extended the scope of the existing network nonduplication
rules

^-^.

92 Id.

at 181

^^

Syndicated programming is norm.ally sold on a
market-exclusive basis, but the importation of syndicated
programming made it impossible to guarantee market exclusivity. The Commission responded by requiring cable systems
in major markets to black out distant syndicated programs
when local commercial stations owned the exclusive rights
to the broadcast of these programis.
The Network Nonduplication Rules remained unchanged
these rules require that cable system.s v/ith m.ore than 100
subscribers delete the network programs of duplicating
distant stations under certain circumstances. See 47 C.F.R.
supra note 218,
§ 76.92-76.99 and Mass Communications Lav/
:

,

,

at 488-489.
^^ Cable Television Economic Inquiry Report 71 FCC 2d
661 and Syndicated Exclusivity Rules 79 FCC 2d at 680-81,
aff 'd in Malrite v. FCC 652 F2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981)

The arguments for this repeal were used also for
challenging must-carry. See infra Ch. Ill.l.b. and note
,

218.
^^ See Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulem.aking

Red.

2393

2

FCC

(1987).

Under the New Syndex Rules a broadcaster can again
negotiate with its program suppliers for enforceable
exclusive exhibition right with respect to syndicated (i.e.
non-network) programming within certain geographic parameters. With a few limited exceptions, a station that has
,
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2)

The FCC's ExtGnsion of Jurisdiction over Cable

The FCC has long been concerned abour the possibility

that cable television systems operating in the service area
of broadcast stations can fragment and dilute the audience
of those stations.
a

As early as 1959,

the Commission issued

Notice of Inquiry to study the problem and concluded that

"there is a likelihood, or even

a

probability of adverse

economic impact for auxiliary system.s upon regular television stations" ^°. At that time, hov/ever, it was reluctant
to exercise jurisdiction over cable,

finding that CATV was

neither common carrier nor broadcaster, and therefore not

included within either of the principal categories created
by Sec. 151 of the Communications Act ^'.

a)

the 1965 and 1966 Rules
In 1965, the Commission changed its position in its

First Report and Order ^^, by undertaking a comprehensive

obtained such exclusive rights to a program may require the
cable system to cease carrying that program..
Under the New Network Nonduplication Rules the FCC
does not limit network non-duplication protection to any
particular period of time, leaving it to the networks and
their affiliates to determ.ine a mutually agreeable arrangem.ent
,

^^ CATV and TV

Reporter Services, 26 FCC 403 (1959)

97 Id.
^^ First Report and Order

38 FCC 683 (1965) Docket
14.895. Second Report and Order
2 FCC 2d 725 (1966).
The first decision indirectly affecting cable transmission
was Carter Mountain Transmission v. FCC 32 FCC 459 (1962)
aff 'd 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.) cert, denied 375 U.S. 951
(1963), where the Commission, under its authority over
commion carriers, denied an application for a cable m.icro-

No.

,

,

,
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regulation of the industry. Fully recognizing that the

statutory basis for its jurisdiction was far from explicit,
the Commission believed that oversight

v/as

imperative lest

the "explosive" growth of the cable industry underm.ine the

regulatory framework already established for ordinary
broadcast television ^^. It argued that without the pov;er
to regulate cable it could not discharge its statutory

obligation to provide for "fair, efficient and equitable"

distribution of service am.ong "the several States and
communities" 100.

1

.

Cable as a Complement to Broadcasting

CATV made it possible "to realize one of the most

important goals which have governed (the FCC's) allocations

programming

-^Ol^

if permitted to grow unfettered,

But,

the

Commission feared, cable m.ight well supplant ordinary
broadcast television. One of the cardinal objectives of the
FCC was the development of a system of free local broadcas-

ting stations, such that "all comjr.unities of appreciable
size will have at least one television station as an outlet

wave system because of its probable economic dam.age to a
local TV station.
^^ See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.
392
U.S. 157 (1968) and Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC
768 F.2d
1434 (1985)
,

,

100 47 U.S.C.A.

§

307(b)

101 First Report and Order

,

supra

,

note 95, at 699
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for local self -c-xpression"

"^^^
.

CATV, because of its

prohibitive cost of extending the cables beyond heavilybuilt-up areas, would not be available everywhere. Many
persons would still be entirely dependent upon local or

nearby stations for their television service. And the
growth of cable might not be at the expense of those

dependent on the grov;th of television broadcast facilities
for an adequate choice of services. Therefore, while CAT^/
is "capable of making a valuable contribution toward the

achievement of expanded television reception service, in is
of the utmost importance to the overall public interest

.

.

that CATV systems and television broadcast facilities have

complementary rather than conflicting roles"

2

.

10-^.

Goals of Diversity and Localism
The rules that were implemented by the First and

Second Report and Order can be read as an overprotective
^'^^

measure favoring the broadcasters
envisaged by the FCC

'

s

policy

^^2 Id. See also US v.

'^^^
.

and their role

It is clear,

Southwestern Cable

,

however.
392 U.S.

at

174 and nore 99.
103 Id.
^'^'^
he FCC enacted three types of rules in its 19651966 decisions
1) must-carry rules
2) netv/ork nonduplication rules (requiring the cable operator to delete
duplication of network programs from imported signals) and
3) syndicated exclusivity rules. See supra
note 93.
:

,

'^^ Up to 1979,

the FCC called conventional broadcasting "society's chosen instrum.ent for the provision of
video services"
Inquiry into the Economic Relationship
:
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that the FCC wanted to protect also a policy and interest
that reached beyond the narrov; broadcast-cable relationship:

the social desirability for a diversity of opinions,

as expressed in Associated Press v.

United States ^0°. This

policy could be developed through

"commercial television

a

system based upon the distribution of programs to the

public through a multiplicity of local station outlets"
^^"^

To the extent that this Marketplace of Frogram.s could

.

be disturbed by the advent of CATV,

the Corn-mission entitlea

itself authority to regulate cable by requiring it to carry
the nearby stations on its system..

In so doing,

it conside-

red CATV and broadcasting as alternative v;ays for m.aking

television programs for the public, and prevented

a

fierce

competition between them which would ultimately result in
the elimination of traditional broadcast services in som.e

areas

-^^^

between Broadcasting and Cable Television 71 FCC 2d 632
(1979) (hereinafter Economic Inquiry Report
,

)

10^ 326 U.S.
^^'

(1945)

First Report and Order

108

Id.

1

at 701

,

supra

,

note 93, at 700.

This is not in any way to ignore or
to denigrate the very real contribution which CATV service makes to the
public interest. Our conclusion is
rather that CAT"/ serves the public
interest when it acts as a supplem.ent
rather than a substitute for off-theair television.
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b)

the Reasonably Ancillary Doctrine

In United States v.

Southwestern Cable

-''^^

the Supreme

Court upheld the FCC's issuance of an order tc comply

v.'ith

the Commission's 1965 rules. The Courr, without passing en
the validity of the specific rules, generally approved the

FCC's jurisdiction over cahle if "reasonably ancillary" to
its regulation of broadcast television

The scope of this test has undergone

"^-^^

som.e

evolution.

In United States v. Midwest Video Corp.

seemed to give a broad interpretation to what

-^-^-^

the Court

v/as

to be

considered as "reasonably ancillary" to broadcast television.

It upheld the FCC's jurisdiction tc require cable

systems with mere than 3.500 subscribers to originate a

substantial amount of local prcgramjning. The comm.ission was

entitled to impose regulations which enhanced services

provided by cable as well as which protected broadcast
television from cable. Chief Justice Burger, however, noted
in his concurring opinion that "the Commission's position
109 392 U.S.
lip
^^^

392 U.S.

157

(1968). See also supra, note 102

There is no need here to determine in
detail the limits of the Commission's
authority to regulate CATV. It is
enough to emphasize that the authority
which we recognize today under Sec.
152(a) is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effective
performance of the Commission's
various responsibilities for the
regulation of television broadcasting.
at 178.

1^^ 406 U.S.

649

(1972) (hereinafter Midv/est

I
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strains the outer limits of even the open-ended and

pervasive jurisdiction that has evolved by decisions of the
Commission and the courts"

-^-^^
.

These "outer limits" were soon narrov/ed by the D-C.
Court of Appeals in

Hom.e

Box Office

v.

FCC

-'--'•-^,

invalida-

ting the "anti-syphoning" restrictions on cable systems
^^'^

.

And in 1979 the Supreme Court created confusion when

it refused the FCC authority to issue "access rules" for

cable television systems with 3.500 or more subscribers
11d 115 11 '.The rules failed the reasonably ancillary test

^12 Id.

829

at 676

1^^ 567 F.2d
(1978)

9

(D.C.

Cir.

1977)

cert, denied 434 U.S.

il4 "Syphoning" occurs when a program, currently shown
on conventional free television is purchased by a cable
operator for showing on a subscription cable channel. As a
result, the program will be unavailable for shov/ing on the
free television system or its showing thereon will be
delayed. The FCC, by enacting the rules, wanted to prevent
that a segment of the American people - those in areas not
served by cable or those too poor to afford cable subscription service - would receive delayed access on these
programs or be denied access altogether. Id. at 25.
^^^ FCC V. Midwest Video Corp.
440 U.S. 689 (1979)
(hereinafter Midwest II
(C.J. Burger voted v.'ith the m.ajority)
)

•^^°

Access channel rules required operators to set
aside channels for public use on a "f irst-com.e non
discriminatory" basis, maintain basic production equipm.ent,
and have a minimum channel capacity. Midv.'est argued that
these rules treated cable as a common carrier, contrary to
§ 3(h) of the Act.
,

^^'

The FCC defended the rules arguing that they would
promote "the achievement of long-standing com>m,unications
regulatory objectives by increasing outlets for local selfexpression, and augmenting the public's choice of programs". 1976 Report and Order, 59 FCC 2d 294, at 298.
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previously established. The Court distinguished its result
from that in Midwest

I

on the ground that the origination

rule at issue here did not go as far as the access rules.
The former did not abrogate the cable operator's control

over the composition of their programming, as do the access
rules.

It compelled operators only to assure a more

positive role in that regard, one com.parable to that
fulfilled by television broadcasters

c)

-^^°.

The 1984 Cable Policy Act

When Congress passed in October 19S4 the Cable
Communications Policy Act, the jurisdictional question

v;as

settled: the Act amended a Title VI to the 193 4 Communi-

cations Act to include specifically cable services.

-'-^^

Commission had thus no longer to derive its authority
a

broadcast-ancillary basis. But the Act did

The

from.

m.uch m.ore

than

that: prior to its passage, uncertainty about the division
of authority between local and federal government was a

hallmark of cable regulation. There was

a

fragmented

regulation about the policy for franchising, its renewal
and the access requirements. Both the cable industry and
the cities (which were the major franchising authorities in

the nation) were concerned about the potential burden of
-^2 Midwest II 440 U.S.

at 699-700.

^^^ Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
Pub.
No. 98-549, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.)
codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 521-559.
,

L.

2779
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this continued uncertainty.

In

franchising areas,

scrr.e

cable operators were almost reguiaced as a public utilii:y.

Congress specifically prohibited regulation of cable

television as

a

common carrier or public utility

-l^^.

An analysis of the objectives of the Act is useful to

demonstrate that certain values developed by Court and FCC
under the 1934 Communicaticns Act have now been explicitly

codified in the Cable Act ^^^ 122^

1

.

Delimitating Local and Federal Authority
Prior to the Act, the division of authority betv;een

state and federal government had been developed through

"deliberately structured Dualism",
the FCC

'

s

1972 rules

-'-^

.

a

concept proposed by

State and local government v/ould

be in charge of granting individual franchises and v/culd

regulate the construction and physical operation of cable
systems. The FCC would maintain exclusive jurisdiction over

what signals could be carried and over technical standards
of systems.

Since this jurisdiction

-20 47 u.S.C.A.

§

v;as

interpreted v;idely

522(6) (b)

^21 See generally 47 U.S.C.A.

§

521.

122 -pi^^ standardization of franchise procedures and
renewals was a main objective of the Act but is not
relevant for the purposes of this research. A com.prcm.ise
had to be found betv/een the (national) goal of encouraging
growth and development of cable system.s and the (local)
goal of assuring that these systems are responsive to the
needs and interests of the local community.
12^ Cable Television Report and Order
(1972)

,

3 6

FCC 2d 143
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by the FCC by imposing Access Rules and Syndicated Exclusi-

vity Rules, conflict about che legitiir.aticn of these

regulations

v;as

•^^'^.

unavoidable

Congress intervened through the 198 4 Cable Policy Act

and

,

it is too early to assess whether it has acccn^.plished its

objectives. Looking at the evolution of the cable industry
since 1984, however, their interests have surely been

better served by the Act, giving rise to the allegation
that cable has now become an "unregulated monopoly"

2

.

-'^^.

Promoting Diversity and Competition
More important for our purposes are the goals of

assuring diversity of information sources and of prom.cting

competition in cable comjnunications
Act had to balance First

Ajr.endm.ent

.

The drafters of the

considerations preclud-

ing abridgment of speech with the desire to establish

structural rules that affirmatively encourage
of information sources

'^'^^

a

diversity

The 1984 Cable Policy Act

.

contains so-called leased access provisions, which require
that cable systems set aside a percentage of channels for
^^^ Most of the program-related federal rules v;ere
gradually eliminated as a result of Court or FCC decisions
See Home Box Office Midwest II
supra notes 111 and 113,
and the elimination of the syndicated exclusivity and
distant signal rules, supra at note 94.
,

,

,

,

-^2^ Gregory, Regulating Cable TV
Quincy Cable's
Unnatural Approach To Cable's Natural Monopoly 31 N Y L
Sch.L.Rev., 757-774 Sumjner 1986).
:

,

.

.

(

^26 See Associated Press v.
(1945) and supra, note 83.

United States

,

326 U.S.

1
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use by unaffiliated prograirjners

^'^'
.

These provisions are

also premised on a marketplace perspective of the First

Amendment in that they are designed to "assure that the
widest possible diversity of information sources are made

available to the public

fromi

cable sysrem.s" -28^ j^

addition, the Act clearly intends to prom.ote com.petition
and diversity 129,

mandates to "promote com.petition in

j_^

cable communications and minimize unnecessary regulations
that would impose an undue economic burden on cable

systems"

^-^'-'.

The Act clearly deregulates, but it is

unclear to what extent this might encourage competition,
given cable unique position of a natural m.oncpoly ^^^.

3

.

Cross-Ownership Rules
The goals of Diversity and Anti-Concentration have

been realized through the Cross-Ownership Rules in Sec, 613
-'-^2.

a

According to these rules, a cable operator may not own

broadcast facility or a newspaper in the
127 47 u.S.C.A.

§

area. A co-

sam.e

532.

12^ Cable Communications Act of 1984
Pub. L. Mo. 98549 § 612(a), 98 Stat, at 2782). For a critique of these
leased access provisions and the marketplace perspective,
see William E. Lee, Cable Leased Access And The Conflict
,

Among First Amendment Rights And First
Emory L.J. No. 3, 563-619 (Winter 1986)
129 See infra
13° Id^,

§

,

;^.m.endm.ent

Values

,

Ch. V and notes 284-319.

521(4)

and (6)

131 See notes 292-301.

132 47 u.S.C.A.

§

533.

See also 47 C.F.R.

§

76,501.

3 5
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ownership between

a

cable television system and a telephone

company in the same service area is also prohibited ^^^
^•^'^
.

613 maintained the ban on cross-ownership betv/een

Sec.

cable and broadcast although some studies, conducted in the

early 1930

's,

suggested elimination of both existing

national and local cross-ownership rules ^^^

.

Congress

removed hereby the ability of the FCC to consider changes
or a deletion of the cross-ownership ban in the future ^^^

.

Clearly absent are any rules similar to the multipleownership rules in the broadcasting sector

^'^'^
.

The FCC had

earlier questioned the arbitrariness of these rules, and
raised the limit to a 12-12-12 combination,

v.'ith

an

This crossownership prohibition is at issue in the
debate about the telco entry into cable. See note 1.
-^^-^

^^^ Exceptions are made for rural areas, where cable
and telephone service delivery may go hand in hand. Id.

^^^ See FCC Network Inquiry Special Staff, Final
"
New Television Netv/orks
Report
Entry, Jurisdiction,
Ownership and Regulation " (1980) (concluding that crossownership would not adversely affect com.petition; cable/broadcast cross-ownership ban should be replaced by a rule
prescribing a threshold of ownership concentration)
and Staff Report of the FCC Office of Plan and Policy
FCC Policy on Cable Ownership (1981) (despite extensive
common ownership of cable system.s with other media than
broadcast, and despite extensive vertical integration of
programming and distribution, there v/as little evidence
that cable system owners were exercising or could exercise
monopoly power in these markets)
:

:

:

ijD iphe FCC earlier declined to im.pose ov/nership
restrictions on cable television system.s
Report and
Order Docket No. 18891, 91 FCC 2d, 46 (1982) and now
proposes to lift the ban on network cross-ownership
FCC
Advances Re-peal of Network-Cable Ban Broadcasting, Aug.
:

,

:

,

8,

1938, at
^^
'

7.

See supra, notes 65-67.
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absolute limit on

25

%

of the U.S.

households ^^^. In

deciding not to adopt multiple ownership restrictions for
cable, the agency also relied srrongly on an additional

justification: the emergence of a more com.petitive national

communications marketplace and the slow disappearance of
spectrum scarcity as

corrective measures

a

rationale for an entire family of

1-^5.

As a result, while broadcast

owners continue to live under a strict regim.e of multiple
and cross-ownership restrictions, cable operator systems

could merge without federal lim.it on the num.ber of urban

franchises that one entity could control.
At this point it becomes important to recognize the

existence of these Multiple System.

Ov.'ners

or MSO's and to

distinguish them from the individual cable system, operators. The issue of diversity appears under each of them, in
a different way:

decreasing num.ber of MSO's is fostered

a

by the absence of multiple ownership rules. On the local
level, diversity is jeopardized if broadcasters and other

voices of expression have no guaranteed access to the
system. After demonstrating a parallel concern betv;een the

Cable Policy Act and the

FCC

s

broadcast policy, this

thesis will now continue to analyze the potential conflict
of these concerns with the First Amendm.ent.

12S See supra
1-^°

,

note 65.

Brenner and Price, supra, note 68, at 4-S.

CHAPTER II

FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO CABLE REGULATION

1)

Different Standards for different Media

The constitutional freedom of press has not been

granted to the same extent over the different types of
media. The First Amendment, al chough crafted in absolute
terms, has begotten different standards for different

sectors of the press. The regulation of each medium was

developed differently, and varied according to its novelty
in use or potential impact on the audience that
to be reached.

v.'as

meant

Historical and sociological factors have

influenced the degree of intervention by the government
into the different vehicles for the free

flov.'

of ideas.

Generally, newer media of comm.unicaticn have been subjected
to a stricter control than the old.

For many centuries,

newspapers, books and meetings v/ere the only m.eans of

public discussion and dissem.ination of information, so that
the need for their protection has been generally realized.

When additional methods for spreading facts and ideas

v/ere

introduced or greatly improved, writers and judges had not
got into the habit of being solicitous about guarding their
freedom. So historically, we have tolerated censorship of
the mails, the importation of foreign books, the stage, the
41
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motion picture, and finally also the radio.

-^"^^

The level

of regulation for media can thus in the first place be

related to its novel or customary use by the public.
A second factor that can determine the degree of

regulation is the perceived impact of the medium, on the
public. Some type of media were regulated m.ore restricti-

vely under the assumption that their potential pervasiveness on the public was too important to be left v/ith the
full protection of the First Amendment

^'^^

Generally, the Supreme Court, in calibrating variable
First Amendment standards, has focused its analysis m.ore on

structural differences rather than functional similarities.
By identifying each medium v/ith unique attributes of

technical or structural nature, the possibility of "abuses
and dangers" ^-^

was of more concern for the Court than

the rules jeopardizing the freedom, of expression

'^'^-'

Because of this orientation, the construction of the
standards was predisposed
140 Z.

tov.'ard

official rather tan

Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 381 (1942)

^^^ See e.g.
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 438 U.S.
726 (1978), CBS v. Democratic Nat 1 Comm..
412 U.S. 94, 116
(1973), Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC
473 F.2d
16,49 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973)
,

,

,

'

,

,

and supra notes
490,

3 3

and 84.

^^2 Metromedia Inc.
501 (1981) at 501

v.

City of San Diego

,

453 U.S.

143 See Metromedia
supra note 142, 453 U.S. 490, 501
(1981) (billboards). Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC
395
U.S. 367, 386 (1978) (broadcasting), Quincy Cable TV, Inc.
v. FCC
768 F.2d 1434, 1433 (1985) (cable).
,

,

,
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marketplace regulation. The Fairness Doctrine
example of such

a

good

a

v/as

media-specific content regulation

^'^'^

but the Supreme Court failed to explain exactly how

Fairness could be upheld in broadcasting but not tolerated
in the printed press

^'^^

The past years have been marked by a grov/ing critique
-

on this differentiated concept of First Amendment rights
^'^^

and in particular the broadcasting industry was

subject to a series of fundamental changes that were aim.ed
-^^^

to put it in line with other inf orm.ation-carriers

.

Parallel to this evolution, a deregulatory approach

adopted to make the industry

v;as

sensitive for the

m.ore

economic forces of the marketplace

I'^S^

Fairness responsibilities were tied upon the
premise that broadcasting was a uniquely scarce m.edium. See
Red Lion supra note 30.
-'^'^

,

,

^^^ Note, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo
Consistent Theory of Media Regulation 28 Stan. L.
(1976)

:

,

-^^°

supra

,

See Fowler and Brenner
note 49.

^^'

,

supra

,

A
Rev.

563

note 11 and Lively

,

See Fairness Report note 35, follov/ed by Syracuse
Peace Council 2 FCC Rec. 5043 (19S7) (abolition of the
Fairness Doctrine)
,

,

^'^^

1076,

Deregulation of Commercial Television

56 R.R.

2d 1005

(1984)

,

93 FCC 2d
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a)

Broadcasting
The regulatory restrictions imposed en broadcasters

have been developed to an extent that v;ould not be tolerated,

as a constitutional matter,

with respect to printed

media, for example. First had to be determined if broadcast
was part of the press at all. Motion pictures v;ere excluded

from the First Amendment's purview for nearly forty years

after the Supreme Court originally denied
^^'^
.

press status

them,

In 1952, the Court rejected this finding and held that

film was a constitutionally protected part of the press
^'^

.

It also pointed out,

however, that "it does not follov/

that the Constitution requires absolute freedom, to exhibit

every motion picture of every kind at all

and all

tim.e

places. Rather, the Court observed that because each

m.edi'jjn

^'^^

See Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus '1 Com'n of Ohio 236
U.S. 230-244 (1915) (motion pictures originally adjudged to
be business and spectacle rather than press)
^-^^

Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson supra note 73
It cannot be doubted that m.oticn pictures are a
significant medium for the comm.unication of
ideas. They may affect public attitudes and
behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from,
direct espousal of a political or social
doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought v/hich
,

,

characterizes all artistic expression. The
importance of motion pictures as an organ of
public opinion is not lessened by the fact that
they are designed to entertain as v/ell as to
inform ... For the foregoing reasons, v;e
conclude that expression by means of m.oticn
pictures is included within the free speech and
free press guaranty of the First Am.endm.ent.
343 U.S.

at 501.
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tends to present its own peculiar problems, constitutional

rules should be variable rather than uniforip. ^^^
As we have seen before,

the two major justifications

for this regulatory burden v/ere the scarcity of the

spectrum
public

-'^'^

and the assum.ed impact of the m.edium. on the

'^-'^

Printed Press

b)

In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo

Supreme Court unanimously struck

creating

a

dov;n a

-^^'^,

the

Florida statute

right of reply to press criticism, of a candidate

for nomination or election. The Court granted a broad First

Amendment protection to the editors of the nev;spaper,

holding that "the choice of m.aterial to go into
.

.

.

a

.

newspaper

constitutes the exercise of editorial control and

judgment. It has yet to be dem.onstrated how governmental

regulation of this crucial process can be exercised
^•^^

... motion pictures are (not)
necessarily subject to the precise
rules governing any other particular
method of expression. Each method
tends to have its particular problems. But the basis principles of
freedom of speech and the press, like
the First Amendment's command, do not
vary. Those principles
make
freedom of expression the rule.
.

Id.

.

.

at 502.

^^2 NBC V. US

supra

,

and Red Lion Broadcasting
notes 26 and 30.

-"^^

,

FCC V. Pacifica Foundation

^^^ 418 U.S.

241

(1974)

,

supra

,

v.

FCC

note 33.

(hereinafter Tornillo)

,
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consistent with First Amendment guarantees of
as they have evolved to this time"-'--'^.

a

free press

Despite the func-

tional similarity of this right of reply v/ith the case

presented five years before in Red Lion

,

the Court never

referred to it nor tried to give any explanation for its

different approach towards these two types of m,edia-^°.

c)

Cable
The examination of cable's First Amendment status

reaches the heart of this research topic. The problems that

will be analyzed arise because of cable's historical

development and the quasi absence of any First Amiendment
notions previously related to this type of industry.
At its inception, cable television

v;as

virtually an

unregulated, uncontrolled medium. In the early 196Q's, the
FCC assumed control of this young industry and issued more

and more rules on cable system, operators.-'--''

-'--'°

-'--'^

At the

late 1970 's, the federal government was getting out of the

business of regulating cable, and the operators were
155 Id.

at

25i

1^° For a comparison between the tv;c cases, see Mete,
Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo
A Consistent Theory of
Media Regulation 28 Stan. L. Rev. 563 (1976)
:

,

-'•^'

Parsons, supra

158 See supra

,

Ch.

,

note 37, at 12.
I. 2. a.

1^^ We recall that in FCC v. Southv/estern Cable Co.
393 U.S. 157 (1968), these regulations v/ere upheld under
the Reasonably Ancillary Doctrine. See supra, note 110.

,
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beginning to find
claiming

a

a

First Amendir.ent voice. They began

constitutional status equivalent to that of

newspapers, magazines and books.
This position became mors and m.ore supported by the
courts. The main reason for this
of the scarcity rationale:

v;as

the v/eakened authority

in Home Box Office v.

FCC

^^'^

the Court of Appeals held the scarcity rationale not appli-

cable in government regulation of CATV.
The First Amendment theory espoused in National
Broadcasting Co. and reaffirm.ed in Red Lien
cannot be directly applied to cable television
since an essential precondition of that theory
- physical interference and scarcity requiring
an umpiring role for governm.ent - is absent
161

The Court referred to Tornillo

-^°^

to hold that even if

there were scarcity "as a result solely of economic

conditions,

(this)

is apparently insufficient to justify

even limited government intrusion into the First Amendment
rights of the conventional press"

-^^^
.

Finally, the Court

noted that "there is nothing in the record before us to

suggest a constitutional distinction betv;een cable televi-

U.S.

^^^ 567 F.2d 9,45
829

(D.C.

Cir.

1977), cert, denied 434

1^1 Id^ at 44-45
^^2 Supra

^^

,

note 154.

Id. A similar reasoning led the Court in Tornillo
to grant newspapers large First Ajnendment protection.
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sion and newspapers on this point" 1^4

rj,y,_Q
_

opinion

suggested that FCC regulation of cable could withstand
analysis under the First Amendjnent only if the Ccmrnission

proved that the regulation
tally

2)

1)

burdened speech only inciden-

served an important governmental interest and

was no broader than necessary to further that interest

3)
^^-^

The First Amendment status of cable has not been

determined satisfactory by the Supreme Court. In Midv/est II
the Court recognized that cable operators exercise "a

significant amount of editorial discretion regarding

v/hat

their programming will include" 1°°, but added in a

footnote that it needed not to decide whether the cable

operator's editorial discretion is of the
that of a newspaper or

broadcaster

a

In City of Los Angeles v.
Inc.

-'°°

sam.e

order as

'^^'.

Preferred Comjr.unications

the Supreme Court had to address directly the

constitutional rights of

a

cable operator who was refused a

franchise license by the city although there

v/as

sufficient

excess physical and economic capacity to accommodate more
than one system for the city.
^^^ Home Box Office

,

567 F.2d at 45

16o This three-pronged test was derived from, the
constitutional test in United States v. O'Brien (391 U.S.
367 (1968)) and applied to the must-carry rules. See Quincy

Cable TV v. FCC

,

infra

^^^ 440 U.S.
1^"^

Id_^

at n.

l^S 476 U.S.

,

notes 215-223.

at 707
17

488

(1986)
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Justice Rehnquist affirmed the Court of Appeals

decision that the City of Los Angeles had violated the
First Amendnient

,

but did so on narrower grounds. The

majority opinion recognized that the activities engaged in
by cable television coinpanies clearly implicated First

Amendment rights. But is was unv.'illing to decide the

appropriate degree of protection to be afforded cable
without the more complete factual record that the trial
could provide. Justice Blackmun concurred to em.phasize that
the proper First Amendment standard for cable was still

undetermined

.

In assessing First Amendment claims concerning
cable access, the Court must determine whether
the characteristics of cable television make it
sufficiently analogous to another medium to
war-rant application of an already existing
standard or whether those characteristics
require a new analysis ... We lack factual
information about the nature of cable television 1^9.

2)

The Surrounding Climate: Deregulation and a Weakening

Scarcity Rationale
Focusing this chapter on cable television and its
First Amendment standing, it is important to realize zhe

political and economic climate that reigned in the FCC and
the telecommunications industry the lasr years. With the

change of the Administration in 1981, ic was argued that

-^^^

476 U.S.

at 496

(Justice Blackmun, concurring)
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the broadcast-industry was overregulated and that the

"public trustee" concept of a broadcaster did not reflect
the reality any more I'O. Deregulation should go hand in

hand with a "marketplace approach", where the public

interest would be best served through the free functioning
of the market forces. The role of the FCC should be reduced
to guard technical standards and regulations only. The

public interest would be defined by the public's interest
and not by the regulatory agency an^^.ore. The public

trustee model was abandoned and replaced by a "marketplace

approach" for the sake of creating increased competition

among broadcasters and other distributors of video-programming. Two factors fueled this evolution. First, a hostile

climate against excessive government intervention and
regulation. Second, a technological revolution in DBS, MDS

and SMATV, increasing the num.ber of voices that could be

carried without altering the physical limitations imposed
by the spectrum or the natural monopolies of cable operators

-'

As a consequence, multiple ownership rules were

''

-^ .

relaxed ^'^, administrative paperwork deleted, and the

l''-'

See Fowler and Brenner

,

supra

,

note 11.

For a description of these new technologies, see
Stern, Krasnow,and Serkowski, The Nev; Video Marketplace And
The Search For A Coherent Regulatory Philosophy 32 Cath.
U.L. Rev.
No. 5 29
1983)
-"-'^

,

,

-^'2

(

.

See supra, note 65.
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transfer of broadcast-property became more flexible

-^'^^.

Wall Street suddenly discovered the broadcast-business as
an interesting project for investment, and the industry

v/as

welcomed in the game of corporate acquisitions, sell-outs
and concentration.

Cable did not remain unaffected by this evolution
^'^'^:

being reduced for

a

long time to an extension of

broadcast operations, the industry underwent
process during the 1970

and cable operators

(

maturing

A distinction need to be made

's.

between cable programmers or
TCI)

a

f

suppliers

(

such as HBO or

ranchised by the municipali-

ties). Cable programmers discovered possibilities for

market growth through specialized program-ming and targeting
specific types of audiences. Cable offered a good alternative for the changing consumer-market, becom.ing more and

more fragmented and unwilling to accept the traditional,

family-orientated formats offered by the networks and their
affiliates. Cable operators, on their turn, reached an

mcreasmg

part of the television watching households -'^.

^'^ Trafficking Rules for broadcast stations v.'ere
relaxed in 1986. See 47 C.F.R. § 90.135. There is no need
to secure federal approval of a transfer of ownership of a

cable system, although the Fee requires routine notification. Id.
§ 76.400
,

^'^ Price Of Cable Television Companies Acquisitions
Is Continuing To Rise
N.Y. Times, June 27, 1988, at 30 and
Cable Systems Change Hands At Still Higher Prices Wall
Street Journal, July 23, 1987, at 30.
,

,

1"^^

:

Cable household penetration reached 52,8
Broadcasting Nov. 21, 1988, at 10.
,

%

in 1988
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While the critics of the scarcity rationale have been

mostly referring to the spur of the new technologies, cable
is the sector that has been most benefitting from the

deregulation.
The ongoing evolution of cable clearly conflicts with
the rationales that have inspired the earlier regulations,

which have been deleted to

a

great extent

-^'°.

Cable's

historical role as extension of broadcaster services and
its duties to serve the local community have been the major

causes of conflict with its constitutional claim.s. These
claims, hov;ever, have not only to do with a legitimate

concern and interest for free expression: at the basis of
this "First Amendment Awareness" was a commercial incentive; the result of structural changes in the cable and

broadcasting industry. Cable operators, like broadcasters,
evolved from a local orientated business to

a

unit in an

^'^ Follows in brief the Cable Deregulation Process
1) the FCC's 1972 Rules took the "freeze" of cable,
permitting to import distant signals under a series of

restrictions
the Leapfrogging Rules were deleted in 1976.
Distant Signal Carriage and Syndicated Exclusivity
Rules were repealed in 1982
creating
4) Congress enacted the 197 6 Copyright Act
compulsory licenses and affirming cable operators' right to
import distant signals by paying semiannual royalties
5) the Ant i- Syphoning Rules were knocked down by the
Court of Appeals in Home Box Office in 1977, freeing HEO to
show movies still fresh form their theatrical release.
6) the 1984 Cable Policy Act
forged from a com.proraise
between cable and municipalities, affirmed the cities'
regulatory authority, but severely restricted it.
7) the must-carry rules v;ere declared unconstitutional
by the D.C. Court of Appeals in 1985
See Cable, the first 40 years Broadcasting Nov. 21,
2)
3

,

,

.

1988,

at 44.
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nationwide chain or conglomerate, v/hatever the extent of
their First Amendment rights may he, it cannot serve to

justify these industries to grow unfettered and to merge

without any restrictions. If the scarcity rationale has
become obsolete, other aspects of the First Amendment and

applicability of the antitrust

lav/s

should be considered by

the Courts when they address the free speech claims of

cable and other media-companies.

54

Regpiiem for Scarcity

?

-^

''

'^'^

The scarcity rationale has been under attack since
many years, and its critics can be distinguished in a
factual part and a part of mere basic economic considera'

tion.

First of all, a number of facts in the technological
field of the telecomjnunications industry have occurred that
undermine the scarcity rationale. A proliferation of
broadcast signals this last decade provided an exponential
growth of cities capable of receiving multiple channels for
(U.S. cable penetration has
television and cable signals
been increasing rapidly for the past fev/ years up to 52,8 %
supra note 175) Cable, low power and subscripin 1988
tion television, broadcast satellites, satellite m.aster
antenna systems, multipoint distribution services, teletext, videotext, and finally fiber optics created a
situation of abundance in the New Video Marketplace. (See
Stern and Krasnow supra note 171) Under these circumstances, the arguments in favor of equal First Amendm.ent
protection for the broadcast media have gained importance.
In the second place, one can argue that scarcity is a
general problem in econom.ic theory and that almost all
resources in the economic system are limited in amount, in
that people would like to use more than exists. The most
common way by which the American system allocates its
economic goods is through the price mechanism, leaving the
users without any need for government regulation. This
basic law of supply and demand has been applied to almost
all sectors of American industry. The main critique made in
the licence system set forth in the 19 3 4 Ccmjnunications Act
is that no property rights were created in these scarce
frequencies. (Coase, The Federal Communications Commission
2 J.L. & Econ. 1,14 (1959), at 12-40) Several proposals
have been formulated to submit the spectrum to the price
mechanism by leasing channels to the highest bidder,
following the theory of Adam Smith that the allocation of
resources should be determined by the forces of the market
rather than as a result of government decisions.
See
Herzel, Public Interest and the Market in Color Television
Regulation 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev., 802, 309 (1951) and
Smythe, Facing Facts about the Broadcast Business
2
U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 95 (1952) By stipulating that the grant of the
license was a privilege and vested no property interests in
the frequency or any guarantee that the license would be
renewed
Congress comjnitted its "original electromagnetic
sin".
Fowler and Brenner supra note 11 at 212) Instead
of being exchanged as a property right, exclusivity to a
radio frequency had to be assigned by the Comm.ission on
am.orphous standards such as the "public interest" and the
"public trustee" concept of a broadcaster. Abandoning a
marketplace approach in the determination of spectrum
.

,

:

,

,

,

(

,

,

,

(

,

,
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As noted above,

the D.C.

Court of Appeals rejected in

1977 the scarcity rationale for cable ^'^. Since the

Supreme Court has not addressed the issue in Preferred

,

the

issue remains unclear. Scarcity has always been criticized
-'-"^,

but at this moment it still remains the cornerstone

for broadcasting regulation.

It is a misconception to

present cable technology as unaffected by any scarcity. Its
channel capacity is limited, too ISO^ Furthermore, Red Lion
is still the law.

California

-^^-^

In FCC v.

League of Women Voters of

the Supreme Court reaffirmed Red Lion by

disavowing any intention to "reconsider (its) longstanding
approach without some signal from Congress or the FCC that

technological developm.ents have advanced so far that

som.e

revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be
required" 182^ This was affirmed by the D.C. Court of

Appeals in Telecommunications Research and Action Center

v.

utilization created many tensions in both First Amendment
and economic terms, that have haunted communications policy
through its history.
178 Home Box Office v.

FCC,

supra, note 160.

179 M-|. j_2 ^ commonplace that almost all resources
used in the economic system are limited in amount and are
scarce, in that people would like to use more than exists."
Coase supra note 177 at 14.
,

,

^°^ See the discussion of the Quincy decision at Ch.

III. 3. a.

and notes 231-251.

^31 468 U.S. 364

132 i^,

(1984)

at 376 n.

11

(hereinafter Women Voters

)
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FCC ^^^, Meredith Corp. v. FCC

^^'^

and Branch v. FCC ^^^

,

although the judges clearly expressed their doubts about
the actual validity of the rationale.

Research Center

In Telecomiriunications

Judge Bork wrote: "the line drawn

-^°°

between the print media and the broadcast media, resting as
it does on the physical scarcity of the latter,

tinction without

difference. Employing the scarcity

a

rationale concept

is a dis-

.

.

.

inevitably leads to strained

reasoning and artificial resulrs"

^^'^

He suggested that

.

"perhaps the Supreme Court will one day revisit this area
of the law and either eliminate the distinction betv/een

print and broadcast media, surely by pronouncing Tornillo

applicable to both, or announce

a

constitutional distinc-

tion that is m.ore usable than the present one" 188^

weeks after Branch

v.

FCC

,

-p.^Q

the Fairness Doctrine was

abandoned by the FCC. It was recognized that the roles of
183 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir.), reh g denied 806 F.2d
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying political broadcast rules to
'

863

teletext)
184 809 F.2d 863, at 866-67 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 1987)
(opinion by C.J. Silberman)
reaf f irm.ing the Fairness Doctrine)
(

185 824 F.2D 37, 49 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 19 87) (opinion
by C.J. Bork) (equal time rule applied to television news
reporter wishing to run for public office, and required
station which employed him to provide equal time to his
political opponents. Rule did not extinguish his right to

seek political office and was not unconstitutional)
186 Supra

,

note 183.

18*7

801 F2.d at 508. Bork also referred to Prof.
Cease's critique about spectrum scarcity. See note 179.
188 Id.

at 509.
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the electronic and print media and the reasons for protec-

ting against governmental interference were identical-°^

Asserting that constitutional analysis should focus on
functional similarities rather than physical differences,
the Commission purported to afford broadcasters the same

First Amendment guaranties as print journalists 1^0. since
the Fairness Doctrine relied mainly upon the premise that

broadcasting was

uniquely scarce medium ^^^, the Commis-

a

sion's conclusion seems to indicate an abandonment of

scarcity as
Court

m.ay

a

rational for intervention. Maybe the Supreme

consider this "signal" to reformulate its opinion

in this matter.

^^^ Syracuse Peace Council
57 R.R. 2d 519 (1984),
remanded sub nom. Meredith Corporation v. FCC 809 F.2d 863
(D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated by order of August 6, 1987, 2 FCC
Red 5042. At 5057
"The First Amendment was adopted to
protect the people not from journalists, but from government."
,

,

:

^'^^

Lively

^^^ Supra

,

,

supra

,

note 82.

note 39, at 965.

CHAPTER III
THE INVALIDATION OF THE MUST CARRY RULES
The must-carry rules formulated in 1965 required a
cable system to carry the signals, upon request and without

compensation, of all commercial television stations
3 5

v.'ithin

miles of the community served by the system, other

stations in the same television market, and all stations

"significantly viewed in the comjnunity"

-^^^

.

The rules were

viewed by the Commission as "critical stones in the regulatory bulwark erected to guard against the destruction of
free, community oriented television"

^'^^
,

Their rationale

was threefold: first, that cable television was a supple-

mentary service to, rather than

a

substitute for, broadcast

television service. Second, that mandatory carriage would
prevent "unfair" competition betv;een cable television and
local broadcast stations for audiences that the broadcast

stations were licensed to serve -54^ Third, that goals of

Significant viewed stations were defined as out of
market: network affiliates obtaining at least 3 % of the
viewing hours in television homes in the community and
having a net weekly circulation of at least 25 % of
television homes. See Cable Television Report and Order 36
FCC 2d (1965) at 174.
-^^'-

^^^ Quincy Cable TV v.
^^"^

FCC 768 F.2d (1985) at 1441.

Supra, note 103.
58

59

diversity and localism could best be served by guaranteeing
a

multitude of local outlets of self-expression ^^^.
The Supreme Court has addressed on several occasions

the breadth of the FCC

'

s

jurisdiction over cable ^5°, but

in marked contrast to the extensive First Amendment

jurisprudence developed in the broadcast media ^^

the

'

Court has never confronted a challenge to the constitutio-

nality of the must-carry rules 198^

j_^

l-^g

lower courts,

the constitutional issue was raised very early but met

little success l^^. The courts most often treated cable and

broadcast television as indistinguishable for purposes of
First Amendm-ent analysis. In Black Hills Video Corp.
^^^ See

Ch.

I. 2. a.

v.

FCC

and notes 101-108.

15^ Quincy Cable v. FCC
768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir.
1985) at 1443 (declaring must-carry-rules unconstitution393 U.S. 157
al), citing US v. Southwestern Cable Co.
(1968) at 178 (generally approving FCC jurisdiction over
cable if "reasonably ancillary" to its regulation of
broadcast television) Midwest I 406 U.S. 649 (1972)
(finding rule requiring cable operator to originate local
programming within FCC s jurisdiction) Midv/est II 440 U.S.
689 (1979) (striking down as beyond the FCC's jurisdiction
rules requiring cable operators to m.ake channels available
for local access)
,

,

,

,

'

-^^'

See, e.g.
FCC v. League of Women Voters of
California 468 U.S. 364 (1984) and Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. V. FCC 395 U.S. 367 (1968), supra
ncres ISl and 30.
,

,

-'-^°
In Midwest II
the Supreme Court described those
questions as "not frivolous" 440 U.S. at 709 n.l9. See also
Quincy supra note 196, at 1443 n.2Q.
,

,

,

Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC 321
F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied 375 U.S. 951 (1962). See
supra note 98 and Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC 399 F.2d
-'-^^

,

,

25,

at 69

(8th Cir.

1968)

60
2^'^,

the only court decision prior to Quincy having

explicitly considered the constitutionality of the

.T.ust-

carry rules, the eight Circuit judged it "irrelevant that
the CATV systems do not themselves use the air v;aves in

their distribution systems."

^'^'^

Southwestern Cable 202 ^^^ N3C

v.

The Court relied on
US 203 ^o hold that the

public interest standard permitted curtailing of the First
Amendment, whether it be for broadcasting or cable.
This holding was rejected in 1977 by the D.C. Court
of Appeals in Home Box Office v. FCC 204^ This case can be

considered as the beginning of

a

change in attitude of the

courts toward cable and its First Ajr.endment rights

'-^-'.

The

rejection of the scarcity rationale by part of the judiciary was later followed by a deregulation v;ave by the

Reagan-administration 206

_

These events prepared a favora-

ble climate for an industry that had passed into its stage
of maturity and growing free speech av;areness. The strong
200 399 p^2d 25

Hills

(8th Cir.

1968)

(hereinafter Black

)

201 id^ at 69.

202 Supra

,

note 109.

203 Supra

,

note 26.

204 567 F.2d 9,45 (D.C. Cir. 1977, per curiam cert,
denied 434 U.S. 829 (1977) The Court rejected Black Hills
because one of its premises for regulation, scarcity, v/as
held not to exist for cable activities. See supra note 161
)

,

205 See
206 Supra

Ch.
,

II. I.e.

note

3.

and notes 160-165.
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affirmation of cable's First Amendinent rights in the Ninth
Circuits opinion for Preferred Corrjr.unications
Los Angeles 207^

v.

City of

shortly before Quincy reached the bench,

has undoubtly boosted this evolution.

1)

The Quincy Cable Decision

In Quincy Cable TV, v.

FCC ^^^ the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

struck down the FCC's must-carry rules as an unconstitutional infringement on the First Am.endm.ent rights cf cable
operators. Circuit Judge Skelly Wright held the rules

constitutionally infirm because the Comjnissicn had failed
to demonstrate a governmental interest sufficient to

justify infringement of cable operator's First Ajnendm.ent
rights, and even assuming

a

showing of such an interest,

that the rules, as presently drafted and applied, v/ere not

properly tailored to attain the governm.ent

promulgating them 209^

r^^ie

'

s

purpose in

court determined the appropriate

207 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985 )( hereinafter Preferaff'd on narrower grounds 476 U.S. 4S8 (1986, i.e.

red
after Quincy
)

)

208 768 p^2d 1434

(D.C. Cir. 1985) cert, denied sub
nom. National Association of Broadcasters v. Quincy Cabl^
TV, Inc. 476 U.S. 1169 (1986) (hereinafter Quincy
)

209 pq2^ comments on Quincy see Gregory, supra
note
Wiesenthal,
125,
The Must Carry Rules After Quincy Cable
TV, Inc. V. FCC
The Attempt To Harmonize Mandatory
Carriage With Freedom Of Speech 3 8 Syracuse L.Rev. No. 2,
745-773 (Summer 1937) and Gaffney, Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v
FCC
Judicial Deregulation Of Cable TV Via The First
Amendment, 20 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 11SQ-12Q2 (Winter 1986).
,

:

,

:
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standard of First Amendment reviev; tc apply to must carry
rules by evaluating two ccnsideraticns

a)

Inapplicability of the Scarcity Rationale
First the court considered whether the First Am.end-

ment principles governing regulation of the broadcast media
should also apply to regulation of cable television.

Referring to its previous decision in

Hom.e

Box Office 210^

the Court considered the scarcity rationale not applicable
in an evaluation of government regulation of cable televis-

ion

,

and held that "there is no m.eaningful distinction

between cable television and nev;spapers" ^^^. The Court
refused to consider the natural m.onopoly situation of the
cable operator, calling this issue a problem, of "econom.ic
scarcity" 213 214_
210 567 F.2d 9 (1977) C.J. Skelly Wright also presided
this bench. See Ch. II. I.e. and notes 160-165.

2H

Quincy

,

In light of cable's virtually unlimited channel capacity, the standard of First

Amendment review reserved
for occupants of the
physically scarce airwaves
is plainly inapplicable.
768 F.2d at 1450.

212 Id.

The court referred to the econom.ic scarcity
problem as parallel to that for nev.'spapers and rem.inded
that the Suprem.e Court has categorically rejected
the suggestion that purely econom.ic constraints
on the number of voices available in a given
community justify otherwise unv.'arranted
intrusion into First Amendm.ent rights.
Id.
citing Tornillo, 418 U.S. 247-256 ('l974).
2-'-3

,

63
b.

Application of the O'Brien test
Ir.

a

second step, the Court considered v/hether the

must carry rules merited treatment as an "incidental burden
on speech" subject to analysis under the balancing test of

United States

v.

O'Brien ^15^

-phe

O'Brien test is usually

reserved for governmental regulations that affect
of speech and non-speech or conduct,

and therefore only

incidentally burden speech. Under the test,
will be sustained if

a

regulation

the rules serve a substantial

1)

governmental interest and
than is essential 216^

a m.ixture

2)

rj^j^^

the intrusion is no greater

Court did not exclude that an

even more stringent test could be applied, similar to that
in Tornillo

.

But it concluded that it needed not to do so

since even under O Brien
'

1

.

,

the rules

v.'ere

im.perm.issible ^^^'.

No Proof of a Substantial Governm.ental Interest

The Court found it unnecessary to determ.ine v.'hether
the must carry rules upheld a substantial governjr.ental

interest. It agreed with the plaintiffs that the very

premises on which the rules

v/ere

grounded had been repudia-

ted by the FCC upon its deregulation of the syndicated
^^^ In Ch. V.

the thesis will examine the issue of
cable's natural monopoly.
215 391 U.S.

9

^'^ Quincy
(1977) at 48.
21'7

Quincy

367

(1968). See also note 135.

,

at 1451.

,

at 1454

See alsc Hom.e Box Office 567 F.2d

64

exclusivity rules 218^

traditional broadcasters
support 219

_

^j-^^;^

threat of cable television to

r^^ie

v.'as

not e"idenced by a factual

"the mere assertion cf a substantial

governmental interest standing alone, is insufficient to
justify subordination of First Amendment freedom.s ^20

2

.

_

Incongruence between Means and Ends
Second, the must carry rules failed to fulfill the

second O'Brien requirement of causing as little intrusion
as possible.

The rules indiscrim.inately protected each

broadcaster regardless of the quantity of local service
available in the community, and irrespective of duplicative

programming 221^ jf must carry were to preserve localism.,
the Court found that the rules,

as they v/ere actually

written, were "grossly" overinclusive 222^ j^

j-^q+-

^j_^

exclude that a less intrusive version of the rules
pass the constitutional test, provided that they

21S wiesenthal

21^ See

,

supra

,

v.'ould

v.'ere

note 209, at 764.

Economic Inquiry Report supra note 209, at
"upon examination of the econom.ic evidence, v;e
conclude that competition of cable television dees not pose
a significant threat to conventional television or to our
overall broadcasting policies."
661

:

:

220 Quincy at 1454
221 Id.

at 1461

222 Id.

at 1460

,

,
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sufficiently supported by

a

factual record. Gnly in the

current form, they could no longer stand ^^^.

2

)

The Century Coinmunications Decision

In August 1986 the FCC announced a plan providing for
a

transitional period of mandatory carriage regulation that

would ultimately lead to the dissolution of m.andatory

carriage entirely 224^

rj^j^^

plan was

a

response to

a

compromise negotiated between the several broadcast and
cable trade associations 22o^ Under the new rules, the

number of television signals which a cable system, m.ust

carry increased according to the system.

's

capacity. This

less intrusive regulation would expire after a period of

five years 226^ Next, cable operators were required to

install an A/B switch for new subscribers at no additional
cost. Such a switch would enable a

223 Id.

viev.'er

to sv;itch easily

at 1463

224 51 Fed. Reg.
209, at 769.

44.608 and Wiesenthal

,

supra

,

note

^25 See The Ayes Have It On Must Carry Broadcasting,
July 21, 1986 at 31 and Brotm.an, The Curious Case Of The
,

Must-Carry Rules
Breaking The Endless Policy Loop Through
Negotiated Rulemaking 40 Fed. Comm. L.J. No. 3 399-412
:

,

(May 1988)
226 Such prepared dissolution is referred to as a

"sunset Drovision".
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back and forth between cable and off-air television signals
227^

Again, the D.C. Court of Appeals struck dov/n these

rules for lack of factual support evidencing the need for

must carry and the usefulness of the sunset provision:

Century Communications,

FCC (1987)

v.

^28^

mj^^

Court did

not accept the "sound predictive judgment" of the Commis-

sion that it will take about five years for cons'umers to

learn about the switch-and-antenna m.echanism. and thus that
a

five-year transition period is needed during v/hich the

agency will provide consum.er education 229^ Judge Wald,
however, stressed that must carry

v;as

not per se uncon-

stitutional, but that the goverr-ment m.ust be able to adduce

either empirical support or at least sound reasoning on
behalf of its measures 230

_

jj^

other words, the Commission

could feel free to redraft the rules un a

v/ay

satisfy the Courts requirem.ents under the

'

that

v.'ould

Brien test.

227 Cable operators argued that such a sv/itch v/ould
solve the problem of local broadcast reception. Quincy at
1441. The switch is also significant in defining relevant
product markets. See infra note 3 43.
,

,

228 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987 )( hereinafter Century
Order for Clarification 837 F.2d 517 (upholding the
requirements concerning A/B switches and consum.er education.) C.J. Wald delivered this opinion for the Court.

229 Century
230 Id

,

835 F.2d at 304

)
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3)

a)

Critique

Misconception About The Scarcity Rationale
The two opinions of the D.C. Court of Appeals favor

a

strong First Amendment protection for cable operators,

distinguishing them from broadcasters on the absence of any
spectrum scarcity. However, the Court repeatedly comjr.ented
that the must carry rules burdened operators because they

displaced programming that v/ould otherv.'ise be carried on
the channels occupied by required local stations

Scarcity is clearly also affecting the cable

'^^^.

medi'-im:

despite the widely held notion that cable systems have

virtually unlimited channel capacity, 3S,7

%

a

of suoh

systems had fewer than 20 channels in 19S4 232^ Distin-

guishing cable and broadcast for this reason alone v;ould
thus be insufficient.

b)

Premature Full First Amendment Protection For Cable
The extent of First Amendment protection for cable

seemed clearly established for the Quincy Court 233^
However, the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue

since it still "must determine v/hether the characteristics
231 Quincy 768 F.2d at 1451-52,
supra note 209, at 1199.
,

1453,

1461.

Gaffney,

,

232 Quincy at 1439 n.

9, citing Television and Cable
Factbook, Cable Services Volum.e at 1726 (19S4)
23-^

Quincy at 1444, referring to the lov.'er Court
decision in Preferred, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 19S5). See
note 207.

68

of cable television make it sufficiently analogous to

another medium to warrant application of an already

existing standard or whether these characteristics require
a new

analysis

^^'^.

The

v/ay

in which C.J. Wright granted

cable such a broad First Am.endment right may thus be
called, for the least to say, prem.ature.

Disregarding The FCC's Goals Of Diversity And Localism

c)

As set out in the previous chapters,

the Suprem.e

Court recognized that goals of diversity and localism

justified regulation of the broadcast industry 235^ There
is no reason to disregard these goals

v.'ith

respect to cable

television, since Congress enacted the 19S4 Cable Policy
Act as an integral part of the Cominunications Act and these

goals have been expressly codified for cable in Sec.
(

4

)

and

(

6

)

521

.

Absent the scarcity factor, preservation of the

"marketplace of ideas" is still as fundam.ental as the

protection of free speech. And the right to free speech
does not embrace the right to snuff out the free speech of

others 236^

rj^j^^

goal of promoting localism m.ust be served

irrespective of the use of the air waves or the coaxial
cable. It is important to distinguish at this point betv/een

Preferred

,

22^ See Chapter

476 U.S.
I

at 497

(Justice Blackm.un, concurrii

and notes 50-95.

22^ Associated Press v. United States
quoted in Red Lion 395 U.S. at 392}

3

26 U.S.

at 20,
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cable programmers,

v/ho

exercise undcubtly an editorial

discretion similar to that of other media, and cable
operators, who deliver the program.s to the public and enjoy
a

situation of local monopoly

'^^'.

The Quincy Court refused

categorically to address this issue, rejecting as "doubtful" and "unproven" the "assumption that cable operators

are in a position to exact m.onopolistic charges" 238

_

j_^

favoring the cable operators First Am.endm.ent claim, the
D.C.

Court of Appeals did not so much deprive local

broadcasters from their right to be heard as it did for the
local viewers from their right for the widest dissem.ination
of ideas possible.

It is still the right of the viev/ers and

listeners which is paramount

'^^^

,

regardless whether they

be served by use of the air waves, cable or other carriers.

The FCC, over the past years, has reversed this

balance in favor of the industry itself. This m.ajor shift
in interests has colored the v;hole deregulatory process of

the past two Administrations, and

v;as

not lim.ited to the

telecommunications sector 240^ 3q

£^j-

>^Yie

Supreme Court has

nowhere indicated that it would tclerate subordination of
the public's interest to that of industry. This v;culd
237 See Ch. V.

and notes 284-319.

228 Quincy at 1450. See Ch. V.l.d. and note 290 for
comments on the rising subscribers fee charges in cable.
,

239 Red Lion 395 U.S. at 390
2"^^

In this respect, a parallel with the aviation and
telephone sector would reveal many interesting aspects.

70

contravene the very basic principle of the First Annendment
241,

d)

Diversity As A Substantial Govermr.ental Interest
Promoting diversity is

a

legiti.Tiate goal

recognized

by the Supreme Court in its rulings concerning chain-

broadcasting rules, multiple ov/nership rules, and

crossov.'-

nership rules 242, j^ ^^^ certainly be considered as

a

substantial governrnental interest as required under the
O'

Brien test, and has been done so by at least one federal

court 243,

'j<j-^g

lack of factual support does not necessarily

undermine the legitimacy of this interest. As the D.C.
Court of Appeals observed in 197S, "diversity and its

effects are elusive concepts, not easily defined let alone

measured without making qualitative judgments objectionable
on both policy and First Amendment grounds" 244,

j^

^-^q

circumstances at bar before the National Citizens case, the
2"^^

Z.

Chafee, Government and Mass ComjT!unication

,

546

(1947)

242 See respectively NBC v. U.S. 319 U.S. 190 (1943),
U.S. V. Storer Broadcasting Co. 351 U.S. 192 (1956) and FCC
V. Nat. Cit. Comm. for Broadcasting 436 U.S. 77 5 (197S) and
supra, notes 26,61 and 49.
243 New York Citizens Committee on Cable T^/ v,
Manhattan Cable TV, Inc.
651 F.Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 19S6),
recognizing promotion of com.petition am.ong cable operators
as an substantial governm.ental interest. See infra Ch.
VI. 3. b. and notes 358-367.
,

^^^ FCC V. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasters 555 F.2d 938 (1977) at 961, aff 'd 436 U.S. at 797
(hereinafter National Citizens). See also note 49.
,

/

Court found the Commission entitled to "rely on its
judgment, based on experience, that true diversity from

commonly owned station-nev.'spaper combination
unrealistic"

2'^-'.

To the same extent,

v.'ould

a

be

the Commission could

have defended the must carry rules on its sound judgm.ent
that without assuring local broadcasters to be carried on
the nearby cable system,

its legitim.ate goals of localism,

and diversity were unlikely to be safeguarded. Such

arguments would have served the interest of the

viev.'ing

public. Instead, the Comjnission choose to serve the broad-

casters interest: it focused its defense of the rules only
on the economic disadvantages of cable's growth for local

broadcasters, atte.mpting to protect the latter

against

fierce competition. Although the Quincy opinion initially
refers to the FCC

'

s

concern to "channel the grcwth of cable

in a manner consistent with the public's interest in the

preservation of local broadcasting" 246^

j_^

narrows the

issue to a pure competitive problem betv;een cable and

broadcasters. Given the Commission's past policy of

deregulation and encouraging competition,
arguments was foreseeable ^^^

a

defeat of its

.

245 id^
246 Quincy at 1442
24/

Neither exhausted the FCC its efforts to save the
rules after the Quincy decision was delivered: absent any
action taken on its behalf, the v.'rit for certiorari had to
be filed by the National Association for Broadcasters. See
FCC won't appeal Must Carry Ruling Cablevision Aug. 12,
1986
,

72
e) Must

Structural Rather Than Content-Affecting

Carry Is

In Quincy

the Court referred to the FCC's Eccncm.ic

,

Inquiry Report admitting the lack of evidence to justify
the syndex and distant signal rules 243

_

However, the

parallel which the Court drew with must carry disregards
the different nature of these rules and the extent to

v.'hich

they interfere with the editorial discretion of the cahle
operator.
As noted above 249^ must carry can be classified as a

speech-neutral regulation, in that it does not interfere
within the content of the program., as did the distant
signal rule for instance. Must carry rather attem.pts to

regulate the structural relationship betv;een cable and

broadcasters in an effort to promote its statutory goals.
it should be analyzed under the sam.e

In this respect,

standard as applied to the rules preventing concentration
of media-ownership. There the standard is found in the

public interest, convenience and necessity, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court in National Citizens

:

"so long as

(the

rules) are not an unreasonable m.eans for seeking (their)

goals", they are permissible within the general rulem.aking

authority recognized in the Storer Broadcasting and NBC
cases 250^
2'^8

Supra

,

note 219.

249 See Ch.
250 436 U.S.

I.l.d and notes 63-72.
at 796
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The First Amendment challenge in National Citizens
was rejected by referring to tne scarcity rationale. Since

scarcity still exists fcr cable
exclude this reasoning in chis
Supreme Court has net defined

^-'-^,

there is no reason to

.T.atter.

As long as the

proper First Ajr.endment

a

standard for cable, the public interest standard of the

Communications Act applies to both in the same

v/ay.

If a

distinction were found, the Court should recognize that
promotion of diversity rem.ains

a

factor of public policy

notwithstanding absence of scarcity.

Most Recent Developments

4)

In January 1989, a Bill was introduced in Congress to

reimpose must carry via the Copyright Act 252^

-pj^g

Bill,

referred to as nhe Cable Compulsorv License Non-Discrimination Act of 1989

,

would amend Section 111 of the Copy-

right Law to provide compulsory licenses only to those

cable service providers who provide adequate carriage of
local broadcast signals. Additionally, the Bill proposes a

halt to the practice of

som.e

cable systems whereby

som.e

local stations are moved from long held cable channels and

251 Supra
252 H.R.

,

note 232.

109 IClst Congress, 1st Session, January 3,
1989 (introduced by Mr. Bryant)
S. 177 101st Congress, 1st Session, January 25, 1939
(introduced by Mr. DeConcini, Metzenbaum., Sim.on and Pressler)
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assigned different and undesirable channel numbers

2^-^.

Operators would remain free to decide v/hether or net they
will carry local stations on their system. They could then

negotiate individually with them for the right to retransmit their signals.
By linking must carry with the Copyright Act,

Congress will avoid the First Ajnendm.ent challenge. The

Copyright Clause of the Constitution grants Congress

pov.'er

to secure copyright to authors for a lim.ited tim.e,

if their

-^^'4.

Although

purpose is to promote the progress of science

this was obviously not the intent of the drafters, the Bill

could demonstrate how the Copyright Clause, as
grant of monopoly, can be reconciled to
the purposes of the First

.^-m.endm.ent

som.e

a

lim.ited

extent v;ith

'^^^.

In proposing this Bill, an opportunity was m.issed to affirm.
a right of the public to receive local and diversified

programming. Instead, the Bill focuses on the balancing of
the interests of cable and broadcasting industry 256^

Critiques of this "must-carry rider" argue for strong
^-'^

shif ting
2^"^

This practice is known in the industry as channel.

U.S. Const, art.

I,

Sec.

8,

cl.

S

^-'^ The Copyright Clause lim.its Congress' pov.'er to
grant copyright protection because it contains free speech
constraints. See Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair
Use 40 Vand. L. Rev., 1-63 (19S7)
,

256

»ij|-

j_3

imperative that Congress address this issue

to ensure that equity and balance are restored both to the
law and to the overall econom.ic relationship betv/een the
two industries." Sen. Congress. Rec S 535 (January 25, 1939)

75

judicial skepticism against this proposal, depicted as an

"FCC-imposed illegal surrogate for

i 1 l£S/-»a"^
ille'-,..-

r^ r^ T- i~ e^ r> *~

r^/^n-*-v-/^,

**
"i

257

The effect of the decisions is object of contradic-

tory reporting: according to comments filed by public

broadcasters in an FCC inquiry, 74 public television
stations have been verifiably dropped by cable operators
and have not been reinstated. And of the nation's 315

independent stations as of July 19SS, out of

v.'hich

160 were

surveyed by the Association of Independent Television
Stations, about 40 have been dropped or refused carriage by

cable operators, or shifted to less desirable channel

positions 258^

r^-^^

threat for discontinued carriage is

biggest for public stations and independent television.

2^"^

Paul Glist, Cable Must Carry Again 3 9 Fed. Corrjr..
1-2 109-121 (May 1987) (making a parallel v;ith the
invalidation of the "family viev;ing hour policy" of the FCC
in Writers Guild of America v. FCC 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979)

L.J. No.

Zoo pifank Lovece, Muddling Through The Must-Carry
Mess Channels, September 1988, 49 (citing House Testim.oBut com.pare with NCTA Study Shov;s Cable Carrying Most
ny)
Stations Broadcasting, Sept. 19, 19SS, at 59-60 and RealWorld Data On A Post-Must-Carry-World Broadcasting, Sept.
5, 1988, at 1.
,

.

,

,

PART II

ANTITRUST AS AI/TERNATIVE FOR CABLE REGULATION
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INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapters

v.'e

have described hew the

must-carry rules developed, what their justifications

v.'ere

and how they have been invalidated by the D.C. Court of

Appeals. The Ouincy and Century decisions gave cable

operators

a

wide power of discretion as to whether or not

they should carry a local broadcaster

cr,

their system. This

power can be considered as an equitable exercise of cable's
First Amendment rights ^^^

.

It can also be considered,

in

some cases, as the pov;er to decide about the comjnercial

viability of the local broadcaster. With

a grov/ing

penetration am.ong the TV-watching households,

m.ore

cable
and more

broadcasters become dependent on the cable carriage to
reach their audiences 260^ Absent any governmental intervention, other legal means can be found to prevent the

2^^ The extent of these rights remains unclear,
however, as a result of the Suprem.e Courts cautious ruling
in the Preferred case. Supra note 169.
,

250

rpl-^Q

p^jf^

switch, as imposed under the unaffected
portion of the revised must-carry rules, would only heal
the situation where a traditional antenna v/as still
available. In many urban areas, over-the-air reception of
broadcast signals is very difficult, if not im>possible, so
that the dependence on a cable svstem. is even enhanced.

77

78

cable operators' discretion from

grov/ir.g

our into an abuse

of its position -^-.

The antitrust laws seem fit to deal

such a

v.'ith

situation, and many commentators favoring the deregulation

process have proposed antitrust enforcement as the appro-

priate alternative for regulatory control 262^

r^y^^

anti-

trust laws are particulary v;ell suited to elim.inate

monopoly restraints in media markets because their enforcement is aimed at allowing the forces of competition to

perform the regulatory function. They provide

a

structural

approach to diversity in ov/nership of broadcasting cutlers

without interfering with their content

'^^^
.

Private anti-

trust suits enable aggrieved parties to enforce their
ricrhts

therebv obviatin'~' the need for detailed '^overnm.ent

intervention in First Amendment processes 264^
This part of the thesis will analyze possible

antitrust claims against cable operators for refusal to

carry local signals 26d^

j^.

^i]_]_

conclude that the nature

261 This position, as will be explained further, is in
most cases that of a natural monopoly. See infra note 2S4.
,

See, e.g.
Rosen, Media Cross-Ov;nership Effective
Enforcement Of Antitrust Laws, And The FCC 3 2 Fed. Ccm-m
L.J. No. 1, 105-147 (Winter 1981)
,

,

,

2°3 Id.

at 105.

regulation see supra
26^ Supra

,

,

For a definition of "speech-neutral"
Ch. I.l.d.

note 145, at 585.

2°^ We will focus our attention on the relation
broadcaster-cable operator or the relation cable operatorviewing public. Therefore, the com.plex process betv.'een the

79

of antitrust itself and the special position occupied by

cable operators as a natural ir.cncpoly cannot resolve the
issue satisfactorily. In the first place, the goals of

diversity and local programming are difficult to translate
into antitrust vocabulary. In the second place, antitrust
is aimed at achieving the conditions of a com.petitive

market. In contrast to regulation, it is not designed to

replicate the results of competition or to correct inherent
structural defects such as natural monopoly 2c5_
However, this is not to say that the antitrust

lav.'s

have no

relarionship at all with diversity: in the next chapter,

v.'e

will demonstrate how the goals of antitrust and the First

Amendment can be reconciliated.

cable operator and the franchising city authority v/ill only
be referred to summarily. Neither will the article deal
with other issues of cable as natural m.onopoly, such as
price -regulation.
^^^ Regulated Industries

at 17.

,

West Nutschell Series, 19S2,

CHAPTER IV

CONGRUENT GOALS OF ANTITRUST AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The goal of the antitrust laws is to prohibit ocnduot

which directly or indirectly forecloses entry into and

competition within any type of econoinic market ^^

'

268^

Such foreclosure can occur through com.bined practices am.ong

competitors or through the existence of a m.onopoly. The
more the number of participants in

a m.arket

is limited,

the

more such foreclosure is likely to occur. The antitrust
laws combate monopolies and practices in restraint of trade

because their existence is assum.ed to lead to less effi-

ciency and higher prices paid by the consum.er. In this
respect, we can say that the antitrust

preserve

a

lav.'s

are designed to

kind of "econom.ic diversity", v/ith the consumers

as ultimate beneficiaries. They prom.cte the control of

private economic power through competition just as diversity of media ownership encourages the presentation of varied

viewpoints. A parallel with the values consacred in the

First Amendment becomes therefore obvious.
2°'

Botein, Jurisdictional And Antitrust Considerations In The Regulation Of The Nev; Communications Technologies 25 N.Y.L.Sch.L.Rev. 863, 872-73 (1930), at 879.
,

9 C Q
^co

pq-j^

^

definition of such

VI. and notes 338-349,

80

a m.arket,

see infra

,

Ch.

81
1)

Associated Press v. United States

In Associated Press v. United States ^°^ the Supreme

Court stressed the congruent goals of antitrust and the

First Amendment:

"That: Ajnendment

rests on the assumption

that the widest possible dissemination of inform.ation from,

diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the

welfare of the public" 270^ j^ Black affirmed that application of the Sherman Act could further the goals of the

First Amendment:
A command that the government shall not im.pede
the free flow of ideas does not afford a nongovernmental combination a refuge if it im.poses

restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom
Freedom, of the press from,
governmental interference under the First
Am.endment does not sanction repression of that
freedom by private interests. The First
Amendment affords not the slightest support for
the contention that a combination to restrain
trade in news and views has any constitutional
immunity" 2'^-'-.
.

.

.

The Sherman Act covers all industry practices, whether

they are medium-related or not: "the fact that the publisher handles news while others handle goods does not
2^9 326 U.S.
270 Id.

1

.

.

(1945)

at 20

^'^ Id. The Justice Department had brought suit under
the Sherman Act to get an injunction v;hich v.'ould prevent
the Associated Press from continuing to operate under som.e
of its by-lav/s. These by-laws prevented AP members from
selling news to non-members. Other by-lav; provisions also
gave a newspaper which had an AP membership virtual veto
power over competing nev;spapers attempts to get AP m.em.bership. AP contended inter alia that such an injunction v/ould
interfere with its First Ajnend.ment rights.
'

82

afford the publisher

a

peculiar constitutional sanctuary in

which he can with impunity violate

lav;s

regulating his

business practices" ^'^ 273^

2)

Diversity Through A Marketplace Of Ideas

These holdings have often been reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court in its attempts to justify government

regulation of broadcasting. They affirm, that the First

Amendment does not only confer rights to individuals, but
also imposes an affirmative duty on gcvernm.ent or on others
to protect those rights.

In broadcasting,

that duty became

even more important since the number of voices available
2'^ Black v;rote for a sharply divided Court.
J. Roberts, dissenting, alleged that the Court's opinion
"under the guise of enforcing the Sherm.an Act, in fact
renders AP a public utility subject to the duty to serve
all on equal terms" Id. at 45. He criticized heavily the
Court's regulation of ownership of news, referring to the
regulatory scheme Congress had developed v;ith respect to
the use of the radio air v.'aves
In that field Congress has im.posed regulation
because, in contrast to the press, the physical
channels of communication are limited, and chaos
:

would result from unrestrained and unregulated
use of such channels. But in imposing regulation. Congress has refrained from, any restraint
on ownership of news or inform.ation or the right
to use it. And any regulation of this m.ajor
source of information, in the light of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech, should
be closely and jealously examined by the courts.
Id. at 48 (Roberts, J., dissenting)
^'•^ Antitrust litigation in the motion picture distribution did not raise First Amendm.ent problem.s
the
anticompetitive practices of theatre ov.'ners and film,
distributors were so antitrust related that the First
Amendment problem was considered as "rem.ote" See United
States V. Paramount Pictures 334 U.S. at 167.
:

.

was limited: "the right of free speech for broadcasters

does not embrace the right to snuff out the free speech of

others"

'^''^.

A multiplicity of voices v/ould create an

"uninhibited marketplace of ideas", in which truth

v/ill

ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance m.onopolization of that market" 275^

-pQ

protect that market, it

requires regulation, just as a free m.arket for goods needs
law against m.onopoly. Such regulation m.ight require

"essential facilities accessible to all, m.ethods to assure
that communication channels remain open, and m.easures

directed at particular communication industries, intended
to promote freedom and to make them perform, their proper

function in

a

free society 275^

rj^j^^

concept of the "market-

place of ideas" was developed by the English philosophers

Milton and Mills in the eighteenth century, and first recognized by Justice Holmes in Abram.s

United States

v.

:

...the best test of truth is the pov/er of the
thought to get itself accepted in the ccm.petition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried cut. That at any time is the theory of
our Constitution. It is an experim.ent, as all
life is an experiment 277^
It also prevailed in upholding the FCC
2'"*
2'75

'

s

crossovmership

Red Lion 295 U.S. at 365, quoting Associated Press
ia_^

at 390

2"^^

Chafee supra note 241, at 471. See also Franksupra note 22, at 19.
,

lin

,

,

,

277 250 U.S.

616

(1919)

at 630

(C.J.

Holmes, dissenting)
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rules

2"^^

and cable local prograiruning rules 279^

policy aimed at promoting localism through

FCC

r^^ie

'

s

a m.ultiplicity

of broadcasting outlets was inspired by this idea.

The

must-carry rules, too often only defended as protectionist
m.easures

,

were also "predicated upon the social desirabil-

ity of having a large number of local outlets v;ith diversity of control over dissem.inating sources rather than a few

stations serving vast areas of population" 280
The 1984 Cable Policy Act contains so-called leased

access provisions, which require that cable system.s set
aside

a

percentage of channels for use by unaffiliated

programmers 281^

addition, the Act clearly intends to

j^-^

promote competition and diversity 232^

rn-^^

cable industry,

however, shows some particular characteristics

v.'hich m.ake

competition in the marketplace unlikely, and requires
278 See Memorandum Opinion and Order 47 FCC 2d 97
(1974) at 1048 (explaining that the prospective ban on
creation of co-located newspaper-broadcast com.binations v.'as
grounded primarily in First Ajnendm.ent concerns, while the

divestiture regulations were based on both First Am.endm.ent
and antitrust policies.) and National Citizens supra note
,

49,

436 U.S.

,

at 775.

279 See Midwest I 406 U.S.
(1972) (plurality opinion)

649,

667-669 and n. 27

280 First Report and Order 3 8 FCC at 700(196 5)
(promulgating must-carry and netv.'ork nonduplication rules

quoting Associated Press
281 47 u.S.C.A.
127-128.
282 See Ch.

I

§

v.

532.

United States
See also Ch.

and notes 58-97.

)

I.2.C.

and notes

,
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therefore

a

higher degree of regulation necessary to secure

diversity 283^

'^^

^^'^
For a discussion of the marketplace
J-^ — WW ^^ W..W w.-^.
TnrrKof
TViia
Ma Vo
Court's First Amendment doctrine, see Ingber
A Legitimizing Myth 1 9 S 4 Duke L
place of Ideas
J-i.*

>-

:

.

t-

_

CHAPTER V
CABLE AS A NATURAL MONOPOLY

Determining the degree of competition in

market is

a.

the first essential step in evaluating the application of

antitrust laws. In the cable television market, com.petition
in the same geographical area is alm.ost inexistent 234^

r^^ie

economic and physical nature of the industry tends to
exclude other potential competitors. This situation m.akes
cable being described sometim.es as a natural m.onopoly.
In the ideal market, where "perfect" com.petition

occurs, buyers and sellers are so num.crous that no one of

them is capable of affecting the m.arket through his conduct
^°~>

.

In addition, the model of perfect com.petition assum.es

that producers will bear the

sam.e

production cost per unit

284 There are only about three dozens of overbuilds
out of approximatively 7.000 cable system.s in the country.
See Kahn, How Safe Is Cable's Natural Monopoly ?
Cablevision, Oct. 13, 1986, at 16. See also Brenner and Price
supra note 68, at 3-55
,

,

,

In a competitive market, customers v;ill differentiate between sellers basing their judgments on price. If
each product is a ready substitute for all others, and if
there is no shortage of alternative suppliers, a price
increase by one firm will prompt its custom.ers to purchase
from that firm's rivals. The willingness of the buyers to
shift to other suppliers in reaction to price increases is
described as the "elasticity of dem.and"
the m.ore the
products are alike, the higher is their interchangeability
and the higher their degree of elasticity. Gregory supra
note 125, at 614.
'^°-'

:

,

86

,

87

over all practical rates of production. These "constant
returns to scale" put

a

limit on the physical ability of

the producer to increase his output. Such "perfect"

competition is seldom, and
going from

a

m.ost m.arkets

"working" com.petition to

vary in

a m.onopoly

a

scale

situation.

The opposite side of this m.arket theory is that of
the natural monopoly. Such a monopoly is likely to occur in
a market with such inherent structural and physical

characteristics that the producers price and production

efficiency is maxiraalized only in the absence of any

competition 28b

^

According to the theory, natural monopo-

lies exhibit the tendency tov/ard decreasing unit costs as

more output is concentrated in

a

single supplier. These

decreasing unit costs or "econom.ies of scale" undermine the
perfect competition model since they cause disappearance of
other competitors: since it is cheaper, per unit, for one
firm to produce enough for all of the market's dem.and, any

other firm producing a smaller amount v/ould face higher
costs per unit 287^

2S6 John Stuart Mill On Natural Monopolies (1S48) v;as
the first economist to write about this concept. Mill drev;
upon his observations of the competitive m.arket for gas and
water supply in London, suggesting that significant
economies would result from the existence of only one firm.
in the market that could charge lov;er prices while realizing the same profit rates. See also W. Shakey, The Theory
of Natural Monopoly
14 (1981).
,

90-7
"•°'

Laws,

31

H,

Haverkamp

(1985)

:

Economics an Federal Antitrust
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Scholars debate over whether or not cable

syste.T.s

should be considered as a natural mcncpoly ^88^

r^Yie

question is far from academic since the position taken in
this issue determines largely the degree of justification
for governiTental regulation of cable television. The Q'uincy

decision, after finding that the cable-as-natural-moncpoly

theory was "entirely unproven and indeed doubtful" ^°^
illustrates the important consequences of such

a

determi-

nation. The increasing rates in cable subscription fees

give at least some support for challenging the theory that

cable systems operate in a fully competitive environment 290 291.

1

)

Elements Favoring the Natural Monopoly Approach
The follov/ing elements argue in favor of defining

cable television as

a

natural m.onopoly:

288 ^^ Posner, Cable Television: The Problem. Of Local
Monopoly (1970). A. Kahn, The Sconom.ics Of Regulation
(1971). Gregory supra note 125.
Contra Lee, Cable Franchising And The First Am.endment, 36 Vand. L. Rev. No. 4, 867-92S (May 1983)
,

,

,

289 Supra

,

note 213

290 Rates for basic cable services have risen 20 % in
1987 and 10 % in 1988: Setting Cable Free
Did Congress
Unleash A Monster ? Business Week, June 5, 1989, at 135,
and the Arthur Anderson Report of 1987
si.x m.onths after
deregulation, average subscribers' m.onthly bill has
increased with 6,7 % Wall Street Journal, Nov. 24, 19 87, at
:

,

:

5.

See also Commerce Dpt. Believes Cable Television
Needs More Competition To Avoid Monopolistic Pracrices
Cable Television, July 1, 1988, at 1.
,

89
a)

Cable television is a decreasing cost industry

;

average costs decrease steadily as the operator's investment and operating costs are spread over
of subscribers.

a

greater number

Significant economies of scale appear for

both basic and pay cable subscriptions: this decreasing
cost curve of cable operations m.akes a m.onopoly m.ore
likely.

b)

Every potential competition is likely to be destructive

cable's marginal cost curve ^^^ is much lower than the
average cost curve so that competition

betv.'een

operators will prove very costly,

neither of them

v/ith

capable of realizing their costs 293^ gQ

^^le

cable

construction

of "overbuilds" is commercially inviable. This argum.ent is

contested on the grounds that the absence of overbuilds in
most areas is

a

consequence of the m.unicipal franchising

process rather than economics of the industry ^^4^

c) There is no

sion service

:

significant substitution for cable televithe new "real-tim.e" video delivery system.s

LPTV) offer no realistic alternative to the

(DBS, SMATV,

much more developed, multi-channel service of cable
2°2 The marginal cost is defined as the cost to
produce one additional product. The average cost is defined
as the total costs divided by the total number of products.
^^^ Gregory , supra
note 125,
case-studies on the subject.
,

294 Lee

,

supra

,

referring to m.ultiple

note 288 at 880-81

90

television. The price for their services is still toe high
as a consequence,

to compete effectively and they dc not,

compete in the same markets. In addition, cable's higher

picture quality and channel capacity makes it not com.peting,

for viewers purposes,

broadcaster

e)

in the sam.e m.arket as the

'-^^.

Cable operators are in a de facto monopoly position

Their situation is comparable to the Otter Tail case, v/here
an electric power retail supplier held a

monopoly under the Federal

Pov.'er

Act, but

lav.'ful
v/as

acquired

nevertheless

held to violate the antitrust laws through its refusals to
deal with other potential suppliers of v/hclesale power ^^^
Cable operators need a franchise

from, the

.

city to v/ire the

homes. The award of a franchise has been subjected to

various conditions, and one of the purposes of the 19S4
Cable Act was to bring order in the disparate local

regulations that tried to organize an auctioning am.ong the

candidates willing to provide the city

v/ith the

best

available system. The antitrust aspects of the franchising
29d Two products will not be considered substitutes if
the market assigns a distinctly higher price to one of
them.
See Ch. VI 2
From a consum.ers point of viev;,
broadcasting is a "free" service, v;hile cable is a service
to be paid for. From an advertiser point of viev;, hov.'ever,
the cable and broadcaster audiences are recognized increasingly as perfect substitutes. Gregory supra note 125, at
649.
(

.

.

)

,

2^^ Otter Tail Power Co.
(1973)

v.

,

United States 410 U.S. 366
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process by the cities are not v;ithin the scope of this
research. Suffice it to say that the 19 3 4 Cable Act is

unclear as whether it tolerates the franchising authority
to grant only one franchise for a particular area

In Preferred Coirununications

,

-^^

.

the Suprerr.e Court

refused to accept the franchising restrictions of the City
of Los Angeles, permitting only one cable operator in its

area, since the complaint evidenced enough physical

capacity and economic demand for an overbuild 298^ g^^ ^ug
Court did not go so far as the Ninth Circuit's lov/er
decision, suggesting that the franchising system of Los

Angeles was unconstitutional 299^ jt did not want to decide
the antitrust and constitutional questions v/ithout a more

thoroughly developed record. The case is actually back to
the district court for a trial on the facts, one of the

most crucial being whether or not cable is

monopoly

3

00

3

a

natural

01.

2^' § 621(a)(1) authorizes a franchising authority to
award "one or more franchises v/ithin its jurisdiction". The
legislative history seems to indicate repugnance against
exclusive franchises. Brenner and Price supra note 6S, at
,

,

3.22
2^° City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Comumunications
476 U.S. 488 (1986) See also notes 168 and 207

259 Preferred,
300 Parsons

,

754 F.2d 1396

supra

,

(9th Cir.

19S5)

at n.

11

note 37, at 73

301 Prior to the Cable Act
the natural m.onopoly
status of cable seemed to be accepted indirectly by the
Supreme Court in Community Comjr.unications Co. v. City of
Boulder 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (holding that Boulder's ordinance, temporarily prohibiting the e.xpansion of the e.'-iisting
,

92
2.

Relevance of the Natural Monopoly Approach

Defining

a

Cable system as a natural rr.cnopcly has

tv;c

purposes. From a regulatory point of viev;, it may provide
an argumem: for regulation. The degree of this regulation

can vary from must-carry rules, access rules up to

framework similar to that of
antitrust point of

viev;,

a

public utility.

lav/s,

hov/ever,

From, an

the natural m.onopoly situation m.ay

facilitate the proof of monopoly

Antitrust

a

pov.'er

in the cable m.arket.

require specific intent to

monopolize. How this intent could be inferred
natural monopoly position of the facility

from, the

v/ill be

examined

at the end of this chapter.

a)

Analogy with the Scarcity Rationale
Natural monopoly offers a strong analogy to the

scarcity rationale adopted by the Suprem.e Court in Red Lion
and subsequent cases ^02^

rj^j-^g

physical constraints of the

broadcast spectrum and the econc.mic structure of the cable

industry are analogous, in that they lim.it the

n^um.ber

of

speakers who want to contribute to the m.arket. As demon-

franchised system was not exem.pt from, antitrust scrutiny
under the "state action" doctrine as announced in Parker v
Brown 317 U.S. 341 (1943))
For an analysis of Boulder, see Botein, Nev.' Comjnunications Technology
The Em.erging Antitrust Agenda
Comm./Ent. L.J. 685, 689 (1981)
For an analysis of Parker v. Brov;n see Susm.an
Wawro State Action Immunity And Antitrust Issues In Cable
TV Franchising 3 Comm./Ent. L.J. 64 5 (19S2)
:

,

,

,

,

202 See Ch.

I.

and notes 30-39

£.•
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strated above,

cable technology is net immune from

-^^-^

scarcity restraints, and its physical structure in the

implantation of the system, in

a

franchise area creates

a

particular type of scarcity that cannot be reduced to
economic factors alone 304

_

Just as limitations on the

available spectrum make it impossible for

m.ore

than a

chosen few to utilize the airv;aves, so m.akes the structure
of most cable markets it nearly im.possible for m.ore than

one cable operator to "speak" in any m.arket. The physical

interference that would result

from, the

absence of broad-

cast licensing has a complement in the cable industry's

tendency toward destructive com.petition

-^^^
.

As a result,

unlimited discretion by the cable operator as to the use of
its channels capacity is inappropriate.

b)

Cable as an Essential Facility

Under an antitrust analysis, the unique position of a
cable operator has also been regarded as that of an

essential facility 306^ This doctrine, for the purpose of
303 Supra,

note 232

^^'^

The Quincy court did so, referring to Tornillo to
conclude that "purely econom.ic constraints on the num.ber of
voices available in a given comjnunity do not justify
intrusion into First Amendment rights". See 75S F.2d at
1450 and note 213.
^^-^

Gregory

,

supra

,

note 125, at 651

^^^ Botein
supra note 267, at 8S7. See also Botein,
New Communications Technology
The Em.erging Antitrust
Agenda Comm./Ent. L.J. 685, 6S9 (1981)
,

,

:

,
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reasonable access, treats scarce resource or natural
advantage monopolies the way regulatory

lav;

treats

a

public

utility 307^ Such an approach, although historically
relevant

--^^
,

is inconsistent with the construction of the

Cominunications Act today. Regulating cable as a public

utility v/ould give it the status of

common carrier, v/hich

a

was clearly not the intent of Congress v/hen the Cable Ac~

was enacted ^0^. Although it can be argued that cable

television meets the requirements of

a

^^'^

public utility

ins model would fail to provide the special circum.stances

the courts have required to justify governm.ental interven-

tion in the First Amendment rights of the individual

^^-^
.

Unlike other forms of public utilities, cable system,

activities are too content related to subm-it

them, to a

detailed public utility law.
'^'^'

L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Lav.' of Antitrust
125
(1977) The doctrine was first developed in U.S. v Term.inal
Railroad Association of St. Louis 22 4 U.S. 3 33 (1912)
(Sherman Act was used to com.pel a group of railroads, which
jointly controlled St. Louis access and term.inal facilities, to reform the term.s of their agreem.ents so as to
permit nonmiember lines to use these facilities)
,

.

308

many states have tried to
public utility. Parsons supra notie 37,

to the Cable Act

p2-j_o2^

regulate CATV as

a

,

,

,

at 137
^*^^

Supra

,

note 120

^^^ Recall the critique of J. Roberts' dissenting
opinion in Associated Press v. United States that AP should
not be treated as a public utility. See 325 U.S. at 4S and
note 272
•^'^

Posner, supra

,

note 2S8, at 145
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This dees not prevent that a cable operator should be

subject to duties imposed en ether "bottleneck facilities".
Such a duty can arise

from,

legislative action or

from, a

court order. We have already referred to U.S. v. Term.inal

Railroad Ass'n

-"-^^

and Otter Tail Pov/er Co.

'

where

,

a

facility with monopoly pov;er, respectively de facto or de
lege

,

was forced to give access to com.petitcrs

.

The Suprem.e

Court has stressed that the legitim.ate right of a

firm, to

refuse to deal with other firm.s was not unqualified. In

Lorain Journal

v.

United States

^'^^

the refusal of the only

newspaper in a comimunity to deal with custom.ers

engaged

v/ho

in advertising activities with a local radio station

v/as

sanctioned:
The right claimed by a publisher is neither
absolute nor exempt from regulation. Its
exercise as a purposeful means of m.onopolizing
interstate comimerce is prohibited by the
Sherman Act. The operator of the radio station,
equally with the publisher of the nev/spaper, is
entitled to the protection of that Act. In the
absence of any purpose ro create or m.aintain a
monopoly the act does not restrict the lone'r
recognized right of trader or m.anuf acturer
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to carties with whom he v;ill deal" -'-^-'
,

.

^^2 Supra

,

note 307

^^^ Supra

,

note 296

314 342 U.S.
^^^ Id.

143

(1951)

.

.

(hereinafter Lorain Journal)

at 155, quoting U.S. v. Colgate & Co. 2 50 U.S.
Associated Press v. U.S. 326 U.S. at 15 and U.S. v
Bausch & Lomb Co. 321 U.S. 721-723 (original em.phasis)

at

3

07,
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This holding was reaffirmed by the Court in Aspen Skiing
Co.

V.

Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.

^-^^

In that oase the

operauor of Aspen's most important ski lift resorts refused
to continue to deal with a sm.aller com.petitor. As a result,

the number of mountains that could skied on v;ith one single

ticket was reduced from four to three. This dim.inished the

quality of the ski-market as a

v.'hole,

since cons'umers

preferred to use as many resorts as possible. The m.arket
share of the remaining ski lift operator on the fourth

mountain declined rapidly as

a

result of the term.ination of

the agreement. The Court upheld the decision of the Tenth

Circuit granting a treble dam.ages suit against the m.cnopolistic ski-operator on the ground that "if a

attempting to exclude its rivals on

som.e

firm,

has been

basis other than

efficiency, it is fair to characterize its behavior as

predatory" ^^'. The case contains many analogies to the

situation of

a

cable operator: overbuilds in the area v;ere
-^^^

impossible for regulatory and practical reasons

.

The

ski lift resorts were recognized as "essential facilities"

by the Court of A.ppeals. Consum.er dem.and and preference

played an important role in the decision. More problem.atic
is the fact that in Aspen discontinuation of the agreem.ent

could not be justified by sound business judgment, and was
^1^ 472 U.S.
317 T,
id.
318 Id.

585

(1985)

(hereinafter Aspen

)

at 605

at 588
city regulations ey.isted and U.S.
Forest Service approval was required to build a system..
:
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only explainable as an attempt to elL^ninate the
tion:

ccrr.peti-

there was no other advantage gained by the refusal

than the motivation "to sacrifice short-run benefits and

consumer goodwill in exchange for

a

perceived long-run

impact on its smaller rival" ^^^. In the case of a cable
operator, his decision to drop a broadcaster does not

necessarily express such an intent: it

v;ill be

inspired by

the need for an extra channel available v/hich, in the

operator's business judgment, he considers more im.portant
to carry than that of the local broadcaster.

case providing the argum.ent that
a

a

There is no

court could reject such

judgment on the grounds that it violates the operator's

duties to favor local programming.

319 Id.

at

5:

CHAPTER VI
FILING ANTITRUST SUITS TO OBTAIN CABLE CARRIAGE
The purpose of this chapter is to examine to

v.'hat

extent a broadcaster may seek relief before the courts to
be carried on a cable system, absent any must-carry

regulation. This requires the proof of abuse of monopoly

position by the cable operator
phical market and for

a

v.'ithin a

relevant geogra-

relevant product market. In the

previous chapter, we have demonstrated that there is am.ple
ground to accept the monopolistic position of

cable

a

operator and his potential anticom.petitive behavior.
However, such

a

finding is not sufficient to find

violation of the antitrust
the subsequent pages,

lav.'s.

a

As will be pointed out in

the determ.ination of the relevant

product market is crucial for the outcom.e of the suit, and
it is precisely on this point that the courts seem, to be in

disagreement. The extent to v;hich courts are v/illing to

consider the cable carriage market as separate

from,

other

home video markets will determ.ine largely if antitrust

litigation is an appropiate alternative for government

regulation in this matter.
At first glance, it would seem that broadcasters and

cable systems do not compete since they are in
98

a

different

99

business. Eut since antitrust

are also concerned about

lav.'s

consumers interests and their viev/point is detern?.inative
for defining a market and their cc:npetitcrs ^20^

argue that for a cable television

viev.'er

^^p>

^p^^

programs from

a

broadcaster or from basic cable service are indifferentiated ^21^ From the business perspective, both business

compete for the same

viev.'ers

and advertising dollars by

offering real-time video-programm.ing to the public.
It is possible to identify three main categories of

antitrust violations: horizontal agreem.ents
agreem.ents and structural restraints ^22^

,

Q^y.

vertical

approach

focuses on the problem between a broadcaster and

cable

a

operator. It does not presuppose any restrictive agreem.ent

between the cable operator and any other program, supplier
^2j. Therefore we will consider only those antitrust lav;s

that are concerned with structural restraints, resulting in
an unlawful maintenance of monopoly

U.S.

-^24^

^20 United States v. E.I, du Pont de Nem.ours
377 (1956). See also notes 346.

S

Co.

351

21 See note

3 63 for the prevalence of the viev;ers
perspective in New York Citizens Committee on Cable T^f v.
Manhattan Cable TV, Inc. 651 F.Supp. S02 (S.D.N.Y. 19S6)
commented at Ch. VI. 3. b.
3

322 Botein,

supra

,

nore 267, at 879

323 Although the market-analysis for such a hypothetical situation would be identical.

324 since cable television companies offer services,
some antitrust laws are not applicable. Such is the case
for example with § 3 of the Clayton Act, which covers only
"goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supply or other
commoddities" See, e.g.
Satellite Television v. Continen.

,
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The Relevant Law

1)

The first important instrument against alleged

monopolization of the market is Section

2

of the Sherman

Act ^^^. Market power is here the key to determ.ine whether

monopoly power exists 326^ This market power can be proved
by evidence of actual control over prices or the actual

exclusion of competitors ^27^ j^ ^q such actual control or
exclusion is found,

complete econom.ic evaluation of the

a

relevant market structure is necessary to determ.ine v;hether
the firms size or its control over price,

constitutes

a

monopoly 328^

-pj-^g

supply or entry

existence of monopoly may

also be inferred from a company's predom.inant m.arket share
^2°. These factors alone are not sufficient:

in addition,

specific intent to use and to m.aintain that monopoly pov/er

must be shown

^^'^

tal Cablevision 714 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 19S3) cert, denied
465 U.S. 1027 (1984), commented infra at note 373
^25 15 u.S.C.A.

§

1

-^2° Rosen, Media Cross-Ownership, Effective Enforcement Of Antitrust Laws, And The FCC 3 2 Fed. Comjn. L.J. No
1, 105-147 (Winter 1981)
,

^^' See, e.g.
United States v.
Am.erica 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
.

Aluminium. Co.

of

328 For an enumeration of all these factors see e.g
3
United States v. Griffith 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (m.onopolization of a film distribution m.arket)
3

(1966)

29 See United States v.

and Rosen

'^^^

,

supra

,

Grinnel Corp.
note 326, at 107

3

84 U.S.

See United States v. Griffith 334 U.S.

100

563

(1948)

a
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Another relevant statute is Section
Act 331; it is the appropiate

concentrations which occur as
vertical integrations

m

of the Clayton

instrument to attack
result of horizontal or

a

"3

a

7

-^

•-)

market ^^^. Our approach does

not directly deal with such a situation, but both Section
of the Sherman Act and Section

upon the concept of "monopoly"

of the Clayton Act rest

7

v/hich in turn requires

,

reference to the relevant m.arket in order to determ.ine
firm's share in the market

2

a

Since examination of the

-^^-'.

market is based upon the same standards for both

lav;s

'^^^

and some of the case-lav; referred to hereunder is dealing

with a claim under the Clayton Act
rations about Section

7

-^-',

we include conside-

in this chapter ^^^ -^'.

This section prohibits any merger or acquisition
"where in any line of commerce
the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen com.petition, or
to tend to create a monopoly". (15 U.S.C.A. § 15)
^-"-^

.

.

.

•^^2

Bennett, Media Concentration and the FCC
Focusing with A Section Seven Lens 6 6 Mv.'.U.L. Rev. 15 9 (1971)
^^^ Botein

:

,

supra

,

note 267, at 893

334 See United States v.

Inc.

,

Grinell Corp. 3S4 U.S. 563

335 See Cable Holdings of Georgia, Inc.
825 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 19S7), infra,

v. Home Video,
note 37Q

3j6 Mergers and acquisitions can take three different
forms
the first is a "horizontal" merger (i.e. between
competitors on the same stage of production), the second a
"vertical" merger (between two com.panies active on different levels of production or distribution)
the third is
called a "conglomerate" merger (i.e. a com.bination of
both). Generally, vertical and conglom.erate m.ergers recieve
more symphatetic treatment from the courts, because they
are often found not to elim.inate any com.petition betv/een
existing firms.
:

,

102
2)

The Relevant Market

The analysis in defining a relevant eccno.Tiic

rr.arket

involves consideration of two separate types of markets:
first, a product market,

and second, a geographic market

33S

a)

Product Market

Defining

product market is im.portant for

a

tv/o

reasons. First, the more products included in a product

market, the larger it becomes, and thus the sm.aller any

individual's share becomes. Second, the definition of the
product market naturally tends to influence the definition
of the geographic market by im.pacting on the determ.inaticn
as to the relevant products,

and thus on the area of

effective competition among separate

firm.s

^-'^.

There is little case-law that has attem.pted to define

product markets for the comjnunications m.edia. Many m.oncpclization claims against cable television operators

v.'ere

filed by direct competitors on the ground that they had

prevented other companies from securing cable television
^^

Vertical integration in the telecomjriunications
market is extremely attractive because m.ost of the .nev;
media operate as buyers and sellers in a n^um.ber of m.arkets
simiultaneously.
Botein supra note 267, at SS5) The
abscence of any ownership restrictions in the cableindustry and the many economic incentives to integrate the
business with program-retailers or suppliers explain the
high rise of mergers in this sector the last years.
'

,

(

^^^ Botein
339 Id.

,

supra

,

,

note 267, at 882

105

franchises in the same area ^40^ Recently, the deregulation
of cable gave rise to some more litigation with respect to

mergers

The relevant product market for the television

^'^-^.

media may take
cable, STV,

number of different form.s: in looking at

a

iMBS

or DBS, a court m.ight hold the relevant

product market to be one of the follov.'ing: all types of
entertainment, all commercial radio and television stations, all television stations, all methods for transm.it-

ting pay programming, or just one m.ethod for transmitting

pay programming ^^^. It could distinguish the basic
programiming service from the extra pay programjning service.
It could also include video-cassettes and define the m.arket
as "passive visual entertainment"

-^'^^-

From a broadcaster or cable operator viev/point, the

product market would include, at the very least, all
methods for delivering real-tim.e video programjning to

a

viewer. But one could argue that the comjnercial functioning
of a cable operator and a broadcaster is so different that
^^0 These claims were dismissed on varying grounds,
one of the most interesting being the Noer- Pennington
doctrine
there is no cause of action under the Sherm.an
Act for defendant licensee to make political contributions
and misrepresentations for the purpose of elim.inating cable
television competitors where these actions are legitim.ate
efforts to influence legislative decisions-m.aking. Susm.an &
Wawro, supra note 301, at 650
:

,

^'^'^

See the case-law infra

^^^ Bennett

I

no

,

supra

,

,

at notes 350-376.

note 332, at 159

^^^ See Cable Holdings of Georgia,
discussed infra, note 370

Inc.

v.

Hom.e

Video,

104

both cannot be considered as competing in the same market.
A court could distinguish both on a difference betv/een

advertiser-supported programming and pay-programjning ^44^
It could conclude that broadcasters and cable operators do

not compete in the same market since the form.er receives
its revenues from advertisers and the latter from, subscrip-

tion fees. Both, however, sell advertising

reach an audience. In Lorain Journal

v.

tim.e

and

to

aim,

United States

^

-^

the Supreme Court, without explicitly analysing the

relevant market, accepted that

could engage in

a nev/spaper

monopolistic behavior by boycotting advertisem.ent of its
customers who also advertised through the local radio
station. Although not advertising through the

sam.e m.edium.

the newspaper could affect the business of the local

station since both of them were com.peting for advertising

dollars which in turn depended upon the reach of their

respective readers or listeners. A fortiori

,

a

broadcaster

and cable operator should be considered as operating in the

same market, since they both aim to reach

audience with

a

a

viev.'ing

real-time video programjning product.

344 jf ^Yie relevant market were to be construed from,
an advertisers point of view, virtually all other advertising media - from billboards to local daily nev.'spapers might be included
Proof of m.onopolization in such a large
market would consequently becomie im.possible.
.

2*^5

342 U.S.

143

(1951)

See also note 314

105
b)

Functional Interchangeability Of Products
The test applied by the courts to decide what

products to include within

a

single product market uses the

notion of functional interchangeability of products, as

viewed by potential buyers. This consumers point of viev;
was adopted by the Supreme Court in United States
du Pont de Nem.ours

&

Co.

^'^^:

v.

S.I.

the determining factor for

identifying a market is the degree to which consum.ers
consider different products as substituable for each other.
The relevant product market contained "those products or

services which are reasonably interchangeable by consumers
for the same purpose"

^'^'7.

in terms of television markets,

it means that the court should examine to v/hat extent

viewers v/ill consider cable television programjning a

separate product from STY, DBS or video cassettes, for
example. In delineating cable and broadcast m.arkets, the

interchangeability of products could be strongly influenced
by the mandatory A/B switch on a cable system decoder set
•^^°.

c)

But so far no court has yet faced this issue.

Geographic Market
The geographic market usually is the area in which a

firm sells in active and reasonably equal com.petiticn v;ith
^"^^

351 U.S.

-^'^

Id^ at 395

3^^ Supra

,

377

(1956)

note 227

See also note 320

iU6

Other firms.

As with product markets,

there has beePx a

tendency to borrow from geographic m.arket tests used in
merger cases under Section
this case,

7

of the Clayton Act

^^^

.

in

the geographic market definition could be easily

defined as the area where the reach of the cable system and
that of the broadcast transmitter coincide.

Since the plaintiff in an antitrust

C3.se

bears the burden

of proof on the issue of the relevant product and geogra-

phic market, he has the following elements to prove:
1)

broadcast programs and cable programs target the

same viewers market in a certain geographic area.
2)

in that area,

there is no reasonable substituabi-

lity between programming offered through cable system.s and

other video programming.
3)

refusal to carry the broadcaster on the cable

system results in

a

unlav/ful maintenance of an,

otherv.'ise

lawfully acquired, monopoly.

^^^ Comment,

Relevant Geographic Market Delineation
The Interchangeability Of Standards In Cases Arising Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 1979 Duke L.J. 1152
:
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3)

The Case- Law ^^^

To date there is no decision that

faced directly

h3.s

the situation where a broadcaster tried to sue a cable

operator under Section

of the Sherman Act for refusal to

2

carry his signal. This can be explained by the fact that

must-carry was only recently abolished
cases are still before the court

^^'^.

^-'-^

and that some

In addition, many

cable systems continue to carry the local broadcaster for
their own economic interest

'^^^

There is authority, however, offering argum.ent for
such a case, although

a

large definition cf the product

m.arket in some circuits may render the burden cf proof

almost impossible.

^-'^

Some cf the cases cited in this chapter v;ere
provided in a lecture by David J. Saylor to the Practising
Lav; Institute in New York on March 9, 1989
Selected
Antitrust Issues Facing Cable Television The outline and
cases of this lecture can be found in the PLI Pub. Mo. 2 57
:

.

Vol.

2

(1989) p.

-^-'^

Dec.

107-210.

The Century Communications decision dates from.

1987.
^^^ See

e.g.
UTV of San Francisco, Inc. v. National
Amusements, Inc. et al. No. 87-3831 (Calif. Sup. Ct. S.F.
Co., complaint filed April 7, 1987) (alleging that cable
operator's movement of broadcaster to less desirable
channel violated state antitrust an unfair ccm.petiticn lav.'s
,

^^^ Supra

,

,

note 258

108
a)

Standing of a Broadcaster
In Midland Telec a sting Co.

v.

Midessa Televisicr. Co

354

the Fifth Circuit held -.hat a broadcast station had

standing under the antitrust laws to challenge refusal of
carriage by

a

cable operator, v/hioh

ov;ned by tv/o

v.'as

broadcast competitors. The District Court for the Western
District of Texas initially rejected the

clai.^.

damages and injunctive relief under Section

4

for treble
of the

Clayton Act on the ground that the FCC carriage regulations
created an implied immunity from effect of antitrust

lav.'s.

The Court of Appeals reversed.

The refusal to carry the broadcast signal resulted in
loss of advertising revenues and finally in ceasing its

activities: such an injury

flev;

clearly

from,

defendant's

group boycott or refusal to deal ^^^. The implied immiunity
was rejected on the ground that the m.ere fact that a

business decision was subject to

a

degree of regulatory

control did not automatically result in an antitrust

immunity ^^°. The court also refused to find

U.S.

^5^ 617 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir.
954 (hereinafter Midland

1980)

a requirem.ent

cert, denied 449

)

^55 Midland 617 F.2d at 1145
^^^ Id. at 1148, quoting Otter Tail Pov;er Co. v. U.S.
410 U.S. 366 (1973), supra
note 296 and United States v.
RCA 358 U.S. 334 (1959) (FCC m.ay consider antitrust policy
in the public interest but may not decide antitrust issues
as such. The 1934 Communications Act v;as not intended to
prevent enforcement of the antitrust lav.'s in federal courts)
,
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that the broadcaster first exhausts ad.T.inistrative

dies as

b)

a

re.T.e-

prerequisite to bringing an antitrust suit ^^

'

The New York Citizens Committee Case
In New York Citizens Ccrrjnittee on Cable Television v.

Manhatten Cable TV. Inc. ^^^ the Southern District of New
York held that subscribers had standing to raise
Section

2

claim against a cable operator

v/ho

a Shern?.an

refused to

deal with unaffiliated programmers. The court defined the

relevant market as the pay cable television m.ovies and nonsports entertainment for the franchise area of lov/er

Manhattan. The injury to the consum.ers-subscribers

caused by the improper exlusion of com.petitors

v/as

fromi the

market resulting in higher subscription fees. This case,

although settled

-^^^
,

and dealing with a conflict between

cable subscribers and cable operators, is of great importance because of its approach to the definition of the

relevant market in the field of visual entertairjr.ent and

^^
Id. at 1149. For more details about the concept of
primary jurisdiction between the FCC and the Justice Dpt.,
see Botein supra note 267, at 897.
'

,

Cit.
Dec.

,

2^2 651 F.Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (hereinafter N.Y.
Comm.
settled Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep., Vol. 53
17, 1987, at 918
)

.

^^5 Defendants agreed to add an unaffiliated pay

channel.

no
its reply on the First Amendment defense after the Quincy
o
decision -^^.
-5

1.

(T

Definition Of The Market
The court correctly distinguished bet'.veen three

interdependent markets ^^-:

l)

the retail market,

in v/hich

the cable operator sells a programjning-package to its

subscribers, and which enjoyed a

lav.'ful

of the de facto exclusive city franchise

m.onopoly by virtue
2)

the v/holesale

market, in which various programm.ers compete nationv;ide to
sell their programs to cable operators. No m.onopolization

claim was made with respect to this market.

3)

at issue was the one in which the programjner,

the m.arket
at the sam.e

time owner of the operator, com.peted v;ith other unaffili-

ated services for the consum.er dollars of the Manhattan's

viewing public ^^^

.

in that market,

the cable programjTier

was guaranteed a monopoly position through the refusal of
the operator to deal with other programm.ers. Hence he

v/as

fully protected from taking in account price decision of
360

rjnj^^g

right of standing for the subscribers comjr.ittee resulted from rhe allegation that subscribers had to
pay higher prices as a result of the predatory behavior.
The court had not, therefore, to consider the argum.ent of
lack of choice for consumers combined v.'ith a dim.inution in
quality of the services for a right of standing under
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. U.S. 356 U.S. 1 (195S) and
Standard Oil Co. v. U.S. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
^^1 N.Y.

Cit.

^°'^

Comjn.

651 F.Supp.

at 807

The court made an analogy with the sale of
different brands of cookies in the only authorized grcces
in town.

Id.

at 807

Ill

these competitors and therefore in a position to charge

monopolistic prices. The court accepted plaintiff's
definition of the product market as that for pay cable
television movies and non-sports entertainm.ent

.

It found

that this market could be distinguished from the "basic"

cable service, in that there

v/as

not enough interchangea-

bility between the competing programmers products and the
other programming provided by the cable system,. It concluded so on the premise that the perspective of the cable

subscriber is of the utmost importance in defini.ng the
relevant product market

2

.

The First

;^jnendm.ent

•^°^.

Defense

The defendants relied heavily on their right for

editorial discretion to challenge any injunctive order

from.

the court. The opinion called such defense "prem.ature" and

noted that in Preferred the Suprem.e Court had not decided

which First i^jnendment standard of revieuv; should apply

v/ith

respect to cable 3°^. it commented also the Quincy decision
and concluded that even if it v;ould follov; the stricter

standard laid down by the Second Circuit, the injunction
^"^ Id.

at 808, quoting Levitch v. Colum.bia Broadcasting System, Inc. 495 F.Supp. 664-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) aff 'd
697 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1983) (independent producers of
documentary series charged unsuccessfully the three
networks of monopolization of the docum.entary film market.
The court defined the market for that situation as the
entire national viewing public)

^^^ Id^ at 818

LAW LIBRARY
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sought for by plaintiffs would still be justifiable under
the O'Brien test.

An injunction compelling (defendant) to offer
programming which it has elected not to carry
in the interest of furthering com.petition
between programmers is "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression" O Erien 391
U.S. at 377). Such an injunction is not
"intended to curtail expression ..." (but to)
allow competition in the programmer's m.arket,
an injunction neutral on its face to different
speakers and speech, providing only that there
is more than one speaker. ^^^
(

The purpose of the antitrust

lav;s

'

,

to encourage com.petition

for the ultimate benefit of consumers v;ould appear to be a

substantial governmental interest

2*56

_

Unlike the Quincy

case, both parties here enjoyed First Am.endm.ent rights. The

injunction would also satisfy the preference of the

plaintiff cable subscribers, v/hich

v/as

consistent

Supreme Court admonishment that the "interest of

v;ith the
viev.'ers

should be considered paramount in the First Am.endm.ent

calculus" ^^'.

c)

The Approach Of The Eleventh And Fourth Circuit
The previous cases may provide grounds fcr

ful suit by a broadcaster:
^°^ Id.

a

succes-

the consum.er-orientated approach

at 818, quoting Heme Box Office 567 F.2d at

47-48
^^^ Id_^ at 819
^^"^

395 U.S.

Id.
at

,

3

quoting Quincy 768 F.2d at 1453 and Red Lion
90
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of the New York Circuit could easily defeat the argument

that cable and broadcast are not operaiiing in the same

market. From a television-watching viewpoint, basic pay-

programming is indif f erentiated as to its source, cable or
broadcast originated. In turn, it is differentiated

from,

other forms of home entertainment, some on an eccnom.ic
basis ^^8^ other on a more practical basis ^^5^
This view, favorable for our purposes,

v/as

blov/n av/ay

in a recent opinion of the 11th Circuit in 19S7: Cable

Holdings of Georgia, Inc.

decision upheld
market for

a

Home Video, Inc.

-^'^

.

The

jury finding that the appropiate product

Section

a

v.

7

claim, in a m.erger betv/een

tv.'o

competing cable companies was the "passive visual entertainment, which includes cable television, satellite

television, video cassette recordings, and free over-the-

air-television" ^'-. Consequently, the challenged merger
could not control the product market, and the claim.

v;as

dismissed. The court did not want to interfere with this
factfinding, unless it was "clearly erroneous"

^"^2,

jt

368 Pay-TV channels will be charged extra for.
3°

T^g2

or VCR require separate receiving or viev/ing
equipment, and should not be considered, therefore, as
belonging to the same market.
5

^"7°

825 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 1987)
by C.J. Adamson)

(opinion delivered

3^^ Id^ at 1563
^'^ Id.
referring to National Bancard Corp. v. Visa
U.S.A. 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986) cert, denied 479 U.S.
923 (1986)
,
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referred to

a

198

3

decision of the Fourth Circuit v/here

a

similar market determination remained undefeated: Satellite

Television

&

Associated Resources, Inc.

Cablevision or Virginia, Inc.

-^

'

^

.

v.

Continental

The case involved an

unsuccesful antitrust action against defendant cable

distribution company challenging the latters exclusivity
provision under which appartment

ov.'ners

either to wire their building on their

had the option
ov/n

expense or to

give the operator exclusive pay television rights to their

appartments. The District Court, applying the Dupont test
^''^,

found that "cinema, broadcast television, video disks

and cassettes, and other types of leisure and entertain-

ment-related businesses for customers
family appartment houses all
test"

.

m.et

v/ho

live in single-

the requirements of the

The court did not accept plaintiffs definition of

pay television services as

a

"submarket", since it "adds

only confusion to an already im.precise and com.plex endavor"
'^'^.

The proof of lack of interchangeability betv;een the

products was on plaintiff: "(he)

m.ust shov;

that because

consumers do not perceive entertair„ment m.edia to be

reasonably interchangeable with pay television or because
^"7^

714 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1983) (hereinafter Satellite Television cert, denied 465 U.S. 1Q27
)

^'^ The relevant product miarket exists of "those
products or services which are reasonably interchangeable
by consumers for the same purposes" U.S. v. E.I. Dupont de
Nemours & Co. 351 U.S. 377 (1956) See also supra note 347
,

^"^^

Satellite Television

714 F.2d 355 at n.

5
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of some market limitation on the ability of the produoers
of reasonably interchangeable prcducts to increase volume

over the relevant dem.and range, that pay television is the

relevant market

d)

"

-^

"^

Conclusion
The above cited cases demonstrate that a broadcaster

has a right of standing under the Sherman Act to challenge
a

refusal of carriage by the cable operator if the follcv-

ing requirements are met:
1)

in order to proof damages,

he must have been previously

carried on the system. A new broadcaster v;ould therefore
not be able to seek relief under the antitrust laws.
2)

he must proof that the refusal to carry was not inspired

by valid business reasons but was intended mainly to

eliminate the competition.
3)

he must proof the relevant product m.arket by shov;ing a

low cross -elasticity of dem.and am.ong consumers betv/een

cable at one hand and other types of visual entertainm.ent
at the other hand.

These requirements, although not im.possible to
fulfill, make it very difficult to sue successfully. It is

therefore doubtful to rely on antitrust enforcem.ent to

compensate the harmful effects of absence of m.ust-carry
requirements

^"^^

Id.

at 356

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

This thesis intended to explore the

and cable regulation in search of

co.Tjnon

lav.'

of broadcast

concerns for

safeguarding diversity in ov;nership and content. Starting
from the fact that the mass media

form, a v.'hole

in v;hich the

boundaries between the different types of comjnunication
become increasingly difficult to distinguish,

v;e

have

examined the history of cable television and its struggle
to evolve from a public utility model to a fully recognized

mass medium with First Amendment rights. This struggle was

successful in part because it occurred in the m.idst of

a

political climate favoring deregulation in the broadcast
media and

a miarketplace

philosophy tov/ards econom.ic regula-

tion in general. Critique

v.'as

developed against this

philosophy in that it seemed to rely too

m.uch on the

marketforces to guarantee diversity of ov.'nership and ideas.
With respect to cable television, the problem,

v.'as

hov.'

to

reconcile two contrasting positions of cable's role: the
issue around the constitutionality of m.ust-carry rules

analyzed to give

a

clear example of this problem,.

116

v.'as

117

The previous chapter has demonstrated that antitrust

enforcement as an alternative for must-carry is not
satisfactory. The antitrust laws are not fit enough to

safeguard such an important but a-econom,ic goal as diversity and local programming.

In addition,

this goal is

countered by the position of cable operators as

a

natural

monopoly, preventing the forces of ccm.petitive threat to

assure some minimum level of diversity.
It is clear that the recant evolutions in the

telecommunications area do not v/eaken the argum.ents for

protecting diversity ^''. While the

nev/

technologies may

end the problem of physical scarcity, their patterns of

ownership may create scarcity in the m.arketplace of ideas,
and should therefore be regulated under sim.ilar rationales
as for the ownership rules in the broadcasting sector. The

scarcity that is at stake here is not caused by economical
constraints

-^"^^

but by a corporate policy to grow bigger

and bigger and to enhance its position in the marketplace
of ideas. Since measurement of such concentration is very

difficult, preventive regulation is m.ore appropriate than

antitrust litigation or reliance on the m.arketf orces

377 5ee Chapters III.
302-305
and

3. a.,

V.2.a. and notes 231-232

^'° The courts have stressed that economic scarcity is
insufficient ground to justify even lim.ited governm.ent
intrusion into First Amendm.ent rights. Home Box Office 567
F.2d at 46 (1977), Tornillo 41S U.S. 246-253 (1974), and
supra notes 163 and 213
,

,

,
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Arguing for reimposition of must-carry rules, albeit
in a less stringent way than proposed in 1965,

is not to

deny freed speech rights to cable operators: the Supreme
Court has stressed that every right is qualified

decision to cancel carriage of

a

^'^'^
.

The

local signal, if unchal-

lenged under antitrust law because a valid business reason
can be demonstrated 380^ could be prohibited under a

diversity approach of the FCC's policy tasks, defined in
the public interest standard

-^81^

The goal of diversity can only be guaranteed through

regulatory action, interpreting the ComjTiunications Act in

a

way consistent with the Supreme Court's holdings in Red
Lion, Storer Broadcasting and League of Wom.en Voters ^°^

Although these cases all developed in

a

.

broadcasting

context they are relevant for cable policy as

v;ell,

since

they share the viewing public as a comjnon interested party.

Rethinking the role of the public interest standard and
revalorizing the interest of the viev;ing public

v/ill be one

of the major tasks for today's telecomjnunications policy

makers. With the new Administration, reregulation

expected, in which Congress will ask
^'^ Lorain Journal
^2° Supra

,

,

342 U.S.

a

m.ay

be

quid pro quo for the

at 155,

supra

,

note 315

note 319

-^°l

The FCC has broad discretionary pov;ers to interpret the public interest standard. Supra Ch. I.l.b. 3ina.
note 49
,

^°^ See respectively notes 30,

61 and 181
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broadcasters' aspirations: reim.position of must-carry v/ill
be given in exchange for new rules on Fairness

^°-^
.

It is

regrettable in this respect that the proposed legislation
to reimpose must-carry via the compulsory license system,

neglects the opportunity to ref c^rm.ulate

m

we have explored

-5

this thesis

Q

/I

-Q'*:

a

fev.'

issues that

Congress could have

provided the "guidelines" the judiciary was asking for to
determine cable's First Am.endm.ent rights. The D.C. Court of
Appeals stressed that not any form of m.ust-carry

unconstitutional ^85^ ^^^

^-j^q

v/as

Cable Policy Act could have

been amended in a way that v/ould pass m.uster on the

constitutional scrutiny of the courts.
At the same time,

it would have clarified the vague and

unrealized goals stated in the Act about diversity and

anti-concentration 386^ This Congressional mandate alone
should already enable the FCC to develop an appropriate
policy.
^°^ Dan Springer, The Pendulum Swings
Reregulation
Is Coming Back, As Cable TV Becom.es The Focus Of A Variety
Of Comm.unications Issues
Channels Field Guide 19S9, at 35
:

,

Peter Ainslie, Making The Though Calls Channels,
January 198 9, at 6 3
Hill Showdown
A Year Of Decision
Channels, January
1989, at 64-67
Cable Traffic Wall Street Journal, April 4, 1989
Broadcasters Seek Cable Reregulation In Nev; Legislation Wall Street Journal, April 12, 1989
,

:

,

,

,

^S4 Supra

,

note 256

^2^ Supra

,

note 230

386

p^^^^ explicitly states goals of diversity and
anti-concentration. See Ch. I.2.C.I. and notes 126-131
rj-ij^^g
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Finally, this thesis will conclude

v.'ith

a

more

general view about the degree of regulation required for
cable television in our society of tcmorrov;. It is clear
that the issue of must-carry

v.'ili

become marginal once the

telco-industry enters in competition
industry ^°

.

Withm

a

v/ith the

cable

few years, the competitive landscape

may have changed all over again, shov;ing

form.s of

nev;

monopoly in the information and entertainm.ent m.arket. The
technical developments in the telecomjnunications sector
could make any attempt to regulate

a

specific

m.edium.

scon

obsolete. It is therefore param.ount for the courts and

Congress to formulate theories of First Amendment that are

resistant to changes in new technologies ^°°

,

and that are

applicable to all media in general.
We have stressed before that the nature of cable

television's activities and the evolution of

lav;

in

This threat has already driven broadcasters and
cable operators together to defend them.selves against a
common enemy, and diminished their antagonism around m.ustcarry. Frank Lovece, Learning to Play in Sv;eet Harm.onv
Channels, January 1989, at 63-59
,

~'°°

Congress attempted to do so with respect to
copyright issues when it enacted the 197 6 Copyrighr Act §
102 of the Act grants protection to "original v/crks of
authorship, fixed in any tangible m.edium. of e.xpression, nov/
known or later developed " (17 U.S.C.A. § lQ2(a), em.phasis
added)
The Act dealt with the copyright problem.s for cable
television transmission, reviev/ing the Fortnightly (392
:

.

U.S.

390 (1968)) and Teleprom.pter (415 U.S. 394 (1974))
cases through its system of com.pulsory licenses (17 U.S.C.
Sec. 111). The Act, however, failed to give adequate
guidelines for technological features such as VCR's and
their use for home-taping. See Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.
hom.e
464 U.S. 417 (1984)
video taping is permissible as fair use)
,

(

121

Congress and the courts do not justify regulation of cable
as a public utility ^°^

.

A determination of the type of

regulation that should be applicable centers around the

problem of whose First Amendment rights are at stake. These
regulations and their justifications could be constructed
on a scale ranging from those totally lacking in social

utility to those totally dependent upon and subservient to
social utility 390^ Since cable involves

a

significant interest and impact for

than one half of

the American population,

m.ore

medium with

its high degree of social utility

cannot be denied. If an equitable balancing of First
A-mendment rights is applied to this m.edi'um, minimum

standards for diversity should be established. These
standards could result in access for local broadcasters and

strong vigilance towards concentration of m.edia-m.arkets

-39 Supra
^'^^

,

Parsons

note 309
,

supra

,

note 37, at 82

^l,
'?,

^
•'<

I

n
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DATE DUE

CAYLORD

PRlNTCOrNU

S.A.

RB
K
46
1989

V35
Vandermeuler, Bruno
Cable traffic and the first
amendment.
j

Ubt bHlt

